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Abstract
This thesis comprises three essays. The first two chapters address topics in commodity
markets and their interaction with derivative and other asset markets. The third essay deals
with the effects to and from fiscal policy that arise due to the structure of the relationship
between central and regional governments. Finance and applied econometrics constitute the
common thread for these articles. The first two take a financial economics and financial
econometrics perspective, while the third essay addresses a topic of public finance with an
empirical approach.
The first chapter offers an explanation for volatile oil prices. Using information from
options and futures I document economically large jump tail premia in the crude oil market
which can be related to investors’ “fear”. These premia vary substantially over time and
significantly forecast crude oil futures and spot returns. The results suggest that oil futures
prices overshoot (undershoot) in the presence of upside (downside) tail fears in order to allow
for smaller (larger) risk premia thereafter.
The second essay relates the comovement of stock and commodity prices to increased
participation of financial investors in commodity future markets. I present a partial equilib-
rium model in which demand for futures by financial investors transmits stock market shocks
into commodity prices via a time varying risk premium. Empirically, I find that commodity
index investors react systematically to stock market shocks by adjusting their commodity
risk exposure.
In the third chapter, joint with Abia´n Garc´ıa Rodr´ıguez, we investigate the relationship
between fiscal decentralization - the share of government spending and taxation carried out
at the the subnational level - and fiscal policy effects. Using a cross-section of countries,
we document a positive relationship between decentralization and the effectiveness of fiscal
policy as measured by the size of fiscal multipliers. We also present a case study for the
decentralization process in Spain and find that it had a positive impact on output growth.
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Chapter 1
Driven by Fear? The Tail Risk
Premium in the Crude Oil Futures
Market
1.1 Introduction
Volatile oil spot and futures prices have drawn a lot of attention from academics, policy
makers and investors over the last years. The origins of this volatility are hotly debated
because the changes in oil demand and supply appear too smooth to explain the large
swings in oil prices (see e.g. Tang and Xiong 2012; Alquist and Kilian 2010; Baumeister and
Peersman 2013). One explanation proposed by Kilian (2009) is that precautionary demand
shocks are an important driver of short run fluctuations in oil prices. He suggests that a
key source of precautionary demand movements is uncertainty about shortfalls of expected
supply relative to expected demand. A natural question is therefore how uncertainty shocks
can be accurately measured and whether they help to predict the future evolution of oil prices.
Yet another is if and how they relate to the risk premia embedded in oil derivatives. The
explanations building on competitive storage models such as the one proposed by Alquist and
Kilian (2010) are typically based on the assumption of risk neutrality and ignore potential
effects arising from temporal variations in these premia. This stands in contrast to the
convincing evidence of significant and time-varying risk premia in oil markets from the
commodity finance literature (see e.g. Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2004; Erb and Harvey 2006;
Singleton 2013; Hamilton and Wu 2014; Szymanowska et al. 2014). We bridge this gap
by presenting a novel uncertainty measure that is explicitly related to the risk premium
embedded in oil market derivatives.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we present novel estimates of oil
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market uncertainty based on the left jump and right jump varation premia (LJV P and
RJV P , respectively) embedded in crude oil futures and options. Bollerslev and Todorov
(2011b) and Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2014) show that these premia - defined as the
part of the variance risk premium that is due to large sized upward and downward jumps
- can be estimated in an essentially model free manner and contain important information
about market participants’ sentiments and expected stock market returns. We demonstrate
that for the oil market, LJV P and RJV P are economically large and significantly vary
over episodes of documented supply and demand uncertainty. The variation measures have
strong predictive power for both crude oil futures and spot prices that is not contained in
traditional oil price predictors. Our results suggest that oil futures and spot prices overshoot
(undershoot) in the presence of upside (downside) tail fears in order to allow for smaller
(larger) risk premia thereafter.
Second, we use a stylized no-arbitrage model of storage in order to show that relative
to the futures price movement, this overshooting (undershooting) is amplified for the spot
price due to the time varying value of holding physical oil in inventory. A relative increase
in RJV P is also associated with a rise in this value that pushes the spot price in the same
direction as the futures risk premium. Consistently, RJV P and LJV P exhibit larger in-
sample and out-of-sample predictability for spot price returns than for futures returns. This
finding complements the model of Alquist and Kilian (2010), in which a similar no-arbitrage
condition in the storage market is used to show that an increase in oil production volatility
leads to an overshooting of spot prices. Their model is derived under the assumption of risk
neutrality and the overshooting is due to convex adjustment costs of inventories. Since in
our model the fear shock is associated with an additional movement of the risk premium
this overshooting is magnified. Under risk aversion, the spot price not only increases with
respect to the spot price in some future period, but also with respect to the rise implied
by storage models that assume risk neutrality. Taken together, these results represent new
evidence for the importance of time varying risk premia in explaining the perceived excess
volatility in oil spot and futures prices.
Finally, to put our jump risk measures in perspective, we also investigate the link between
LJV P , RJV P and real economic activity as well as macroeconomic uncertainty. The oil fear
measures appear not to be spanned by aggregate uncertainty. Also, there is little evidence of
a stable linear relationship between stock market returns, LJV P and RJV P . The results are
consistent with the idea that the oil tail risk measures aggregate different types of uncertainty
that are relevant for oil prices, e.g. oil supply and oil demand uncertainty, that individually
have a very distinct relationship with aggregate uncertainty.
There are several reasons for focusing on the tails of the oil price distribution to quantify
uncertainty. First, recent theoretical works show that models with tail risks can account for
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the high equity risk premium and excess market return volatility (Barro 2006; Wachter 2013).
There is also increasing evidence that the index option implied compensation for aggregate
market volatility and tail risks are closely connected to economic uncertainty and temporal
variation in risk aversion (Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou 2009; Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu
2014). In contrast, most of the commodity finance literature has focused on futures, ignoring
potential information from the related option prices. Among the exceptions are Trolle and
Schwartz (2010), who document a significant and time-varying variance risk premium in the
crude oil option market and Kang and Pan (2013) who show that this premium forecasts
short term futures returns. We find that most, if not all of the variance risk premium
and its forecasting power is due to time varying compensation for tail variations. One of the
advantage of considering tail risk premia is that they are naturally separated into upside and
downside uncertainty, thus providing additional information beyond that contained in the
variance risk premium. We show that in particular the time varying asymmetry of the jump
premia across the two tails improves the prediction spot and futures returns. Based on the
variance risk decomposition proposed by Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b), we present evidence
that this asymmetry reflects changes in effective risk aversion of oil market participants. On
a more general level, these findings suggest that time varying disaster fears embedded in
option prices of individual assets, not only on market indexes, convey important information
on the their return dynamics.
Formally, RJV P and LJV P are defined as the difference of the conditional expected
variation of jump tails under the statistical, objective probability measure and the risk neu-
tral measure. In other words, they represent the difference of the expected actual jump
variations and the option implied market price for the insurance against these jump vari-
ations. Our implemented model for the option implied jump-measures follows Bollerslev,
Todorov, and Xu (2014). It is semi-parametric and flexible, allowing the tail distributions
to differ across the left and the right tail and for independent time variation in the shape
and level of the tails. The empirical estimation is based on panel of out-of-money (OTM)
call and put options. Intuitively, short-maturity OTM options are most sensitive to large
jumps, which allows us to separate the jump risk from the diffusive risk. The statistical
jump variation is based on intraday futures data and non-parametric methods developed by
Bollerslev and Todorov (2011a). Empirically, we find that the statistical jump variations in
oil futures are significantly smaller than their risk neutral counterparts. Moreover, the actual
jumps are approximately symmetric, while the option implied prices for these jumps display
time-varying asymmetries. Thus the observed time variation in the relative size of RJV P
and LJV P are largely void of influences from the actual jumps, and can be interpreted as a
direct measure of investor fears (Bollerslev and Todorov 2011b).
On average, the LJV P tends to be larger than RJV P , implying that oil investors are
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on average requesting a higher premium when downside-risks predominate. This is largely
consistent with the theory of normal backwardation (Keynes 1976). Accordingly, when
producers of the physical commodity want to hedge their price risk using derivatives, then
arbitrageurs who take the other side of the contract have to be compensated in form of a
risk premium order to take on the risk. Our empirical estimates imply that on average about
half futures risk premium is due to large jump risks.
Last, we contribute to a strand of literature going back to the idea of Bernanke (1983) that
oil market uncertainty - rather than oil price changes alone - is a key variable to understand
the relationship between the oil market and macroeconomic outcomes. Our measures provide
precise definitions and estimates for oil price uncertainty, and we discuss some interactions
with aggregate variables towards the end of the paper.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a formal
definition of the tail risk variation measures, and explains the spot price overshooting. In
section 3 we discuss the empirical implementation and data as well as the properties of our
estimates. Section 4 presents the forecasting results and section 5 the interaction of the jump
tail premia with aggregate outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Setup
1.2.1 Setup and Definitions
In this section, we present the general setup and provide formal definitions for our tail risk
measures. This setup is inspired by Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b) and Bollerslev, Todorov,
and Xu (2014). Instead of considering the (aggregate) stock market, we will focus on the
dynamics of an individual asset, namely oil futures.
To fix ideas, let (Ω,F ,P) be a filtered probability space with the filtration (Ft)t≥0 and
let Ft denote the price of a crude oil futures contract. The dynamics of the futures price are
described by the following jump diffusion process
dFt
Ft−
= αtdt+ σtdWt +
∫
R
(ex − 1)µ˜(dt, dx), (1.1)
where the drift αt and the stochastic volatility σt are assumed to be locally bounded ca`dla`g
processes, and Wt is a standard Brownian Motion. Here µ˜(dt, dx) = µ(dt, dx) − vPt (dx)dt
denotes a compensated jump measure, with µ(dt, dx) the counting measure and vPt (dx)dt the
compensator of jumps, where P denotes the statistical, objective measure .1
Under standard non-arbitrage assumptions, there exists a risk-neutral measure denoted
1The compensator vPt (dx)dt ensures that the jump measure µ˜(dt, dx) is a martingale.
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Q, under which the futures price follows a martingale of the form
dFt
Ft−
= atdt+ σtdW
Q
t +
∫
R
(ex − 1)µ˜Q(dt, dx), (1.2)
where at denotes the drift, dW
Q
t is a Brownian motion with respect to the risk neutral
measure and µ˜Q = µ(dt, dx) − vQt (dx)dt denotes the jump measure under Q following the
previous decomposition. In general, the change of measure alters both the drift and the
jump intensity describing the dynamics of the futures price while the volatility associated
with the Brownian motions remains the same under both measures. This reflects the special
pricing of jumps in comparison with continuous movements.
Our interest will be in both the futures risks premium (FRP ) - a premium reflecting risk
associated with holding a (long) futures contract - and the variance risk premium (V RP ) - a
premium reflecting risks associated with holding a (long) variance swap - that are associated
with the jump part of the futures price. Following Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b), the FRP
at time t and for some T > t is defined as
FRPt,T ≡ 1
T − t
(
EPt
(
FT − Ft
Ft
)
− EQt
(
FT − Ft
Ft
))
. (1.3)
Since the futures price Ft is a martingale under the Q-measure, FRPt,T is effectively deter-
mined by the difference of the objective expectation of the futures price at some future date
T and the current futures price.
Given our jump diffusion model in equation (1.1) we can, without loss of generality, define
the FRP due to large jumps above some threshold kt > 0,
FRPt,T (kt) ≡ 1
T − tE
P
t
(∫ T
t
∫
|x|>kt
(ex − 1)vPs (dx)ds
)
−
1
T − tE
Q
t
(∫ T
t
∫
|x|>kt
(ex − 1)vQs (dx)ds
)
. (1.4)
Going one step further, we can decompose FRPt(kt) into the contributions from large positive
and large negative jumps
FRPt,T (kt) = FRP
+
t,T (kt) + FRP
−
t,T (kt), (1.5)
where FRP+t,T (kt) captures the futures risk premia due to x > kt and FRP
−
t,T (kt) captures
the premia due to x < −kt.
The variability of the futures price is measured by the quadratic variation QV of its
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log-price process of the interval [t, T ]
QV[t,T ] =
∫ T
t
σ2sds+
∫ T
t
∫
R
x2µ(ds, dx). (1.6)
Similar to the futures risk premium, V RPt,T is formally defined as as the difference of the
expected quadratic variation over the T − t period under the respective probability measure.
V RPt =
1
T − t(E
P
t (QV[t,T ])− EQt (QV[t,T ])). (1.7)
Under this definition of the variance risk premium, V RPt equals the expected payoff from
a long variance swap contract (Carr and Wu 2009). The variance risk premium is also
naturally decomposed into a part associated with the continuous-time stochastic volatility
process σs and a part that is due to jumps. We denote RJV
P
t,T (kt) and LJV
P
t,T (kt) the
predictable component of the quadratic variation arising through large positive and large
negative jumps under the P measure
RJV Pt,T (kt) =
∫ T
t
∫
x>kt
x2vPs (dx)ds, LJV
P
t,T (kt) =
∫ T
t
∫
x<−kt
x2vPs (dx)ds (1.8)
and their counterparts under the risk neutral measure Q
RJV Qt,T (kt) =
∫ T
t
∫
x>kt
x2vQs (dx)ds, LJV
Q
t,T (kt) =
∫ T
t
∫
x<−kt
x2vQs (dx)ds. (1.9)
The part of the variance risk premium due to large positive jumps is then
RJV P (kt) ≡ 1
T − t
(
EPt
(
RJV Pt,T (kt)
)− EQt (RJV Qt,T (kt))) , (1.10)
while the part due to large negative jumps is
LJV P (kt) ≡ 1
T − t
(
EPt
(
LJV Pt,T (kt)
)− EQt (LJV Qt,T (kt))) . (1.11)
As suggested by Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b), for equity index option the difference
between LJV P (kt) and RJV P (kt) is naturally associated with investors’ fear. In this paper
we investigate this hypothesis for the oil market and define
FIt(kt) ≡ LJV P (kt)−RJV P (kt). (1.12)
The index FIt measures the asymmetry between the premium requested for the downside
variance risk and the premium charged for upside variance risk that is due to large jumps.
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Under the above definition, a relatively large left jump variation premia or ”downside fear”
is associated with a low value of FIt(k).
The respective premia can then be estimated in an essentially model free manner using
high-frequency returns and options data. The next section discusses this procedure in more
detail. Before, we turn to the relationship between risk premia and spot prices.
1.2.2 Risk Premia and Spot Prices
In this section, we present a theoretical framework based on no-arbitrage conditions that
relates the risk premia to oil spot prices. We show that in general, an increase in the futures
risk premium associated with a rise in market participants fears - as proxied by the tail risk
premia - will drive a temporary wedge between the current and expected prices for both
futures and spot prices. Since this wedge subsequently reverts to zero, our model predicts
that futures and spot prices overshoot with respect to future prices in the wake of disaster
fears.
For our analysis we draw on non-arbitrage conditions derived from two different ap-
proaches to commodity derivative pricing that allow to relate the current futures price and
the current spot price to the expected spot price some period ahead.2 The first approach
is based on the basic definition of the futures risk premium as described in equation (1.3).
By non-arbitrage, the value of the futures price at the time of maturity must be equal to
the spot price of the commodity. Hence FT,T = ST , where ST stands for the spot price of
oil at time T , and where in slight abuse of notation we let T denote the contract’s terminal
date for the remainder of this subsection. Moreover, since Ft,T is a martingale under the
Q-measure, it follows that
1 + (T − t)FRPt,T = Et(ST )
Ft,T
=
Et(Ft,T )
Ft,T
. (1.13)
Equation (1.13) reflects the non-arbitrage condition that the price of a futures has to be
equal to the expected spot price discounted by the premium associated with holding the
futures contract. This decomposition of the futures price into the expected spot price and
a risk premium has been used frequently in the analysis of the futures risk premium. The
empirical and theoretical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that in the oil market, and in
commodity markets in general, the (net) premium is on average positive and fluctuating over
time (e.g. Keynes 1976; Bessembinder 1992; Hamilton and Wu 2014; Baumeister and Kilian
2014).
2The setup is similar to the one in Gospodinov and Ng (2013). In our model, however, we explicitly
focus on the effect of the tail premia and their interaction with the futures risk premium and the convenience
yield, whereas Gospodinov and Ng (2013) focus exclusively on the latter.
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The second non-arbitrage condition is based on the theory of storage, going back to the
works of Kaldor (1939) and Working (1949). A distinguishing feature of commodities as an
asset class is the significance of the convenience yield, defined as the benefit of immediate
availability of a physical commodity rather than a time T contingent claim on the commodity
(see e.g. Fama and French 1987). This benefit links the futures to the spot price through
the following relationship
Ft,T = St(1− (T − t)CYt,T ), (1.14)
where CYt,T is the (net of storage costs and interest rate outlays) equilibrium convenience
yield, in annualized terms. This equation has to hold under non-arbitrage, since the price
of a futures contract has to be equal to the cost of buying the commodity now minus the
net benefits of carrying the commodity to maturity. Such benefits can arise due to a variety
reasons such as temporary stock-outs and associated price spikes or convex adjustment costs.
Importantly, the convenience yield can also be interpreted as a call option on a futures
contract (Milonas and Thomadakis 1997). Given that our fear measured is derived from
actual option prices on the futures, we expect a close link between oil market fears and the
convenience yield.
From the decomposition of the futures risk premium into contributions from positive and
negative large jumps, equations (1.4) and (1.5), it follows that an exogenous, relative shift
in the tail risk premium associated with the right tail above that of the left tail will decrease
FRPt,T . Equation (1.13) then implies that the futures price will rise above the expected spot
price, and is expected to decline towards to spot price thereafter. Moreover, the size of the
shift in the futures price will be determined by the change in the futures risk premium. In
order to investigate the relationship between current and expected spot prices, we combine
equation (1.13) and (1.14), obtaining the following relationship between the current and the
expected spot price
Et(ST )
St
= (1 + (T − t)FRP t,T )(1− (T − t)CYt,T ). (1.15)
Thus under no-arbitrage, the (relative to the expected spot price) price of current spot oil
is determined by the net value of holding the physical oil in storage and the futures risk
premium. Moreover, a tail fear induced the change in the spot price is unambiguously larger
than the change in the futures price if the net convenience yield varies negatively with the
relative size of the tail risk measures. In this case, the spot prices not only overshoot with
respect to expected spot prices, but also with respect to the current futures price. The
expected spot and futures returns, r(T−t),S and r(T−t),F , respectively, that are associated
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with a relative increase in the right tail variation measure should therefore exhibit
Et(r(T−t),S|RJV Pt > LJV Pt) < Et(r(T−t),F |RJV Pt > LJV Pt) < 0, (1.16)
with an inverse relationship for relative increases in the left tail measure. Considering
a temporary, mean preserving change in the tail risk measures, i.e. a change such that
Et(ST |RJV Pt > LJV Pt) = Et(ST |RJV Pt = LJV Pt), equation (1.16) implies that both the
spot and the futures price have to adjust immediately by an upward movement.3 Moreover,
the underlying mechanism does not rely on any shifts in inventories. This is important, since
some of the large price fluctuations, e.g. around the 1991 Gulf War, are difficult to reconcile
with the observed changes in inventory (Kilian and Murphy 2014).
Of course, equation (1.16) rests on the assumption that the net convenience yield varies
negatively with FIt. Subsequently we show that FIt is inversely related to the market
prices of out-of-the-money options. The interpretation of the convenience yield as an op-
tion suggests therefore that we should expect this inverse relationship to hold theoretically.
Empirically this assumption is justified by our data, as we find a strong and statistically
significant correlation of almost −40% between our measure of FIt and the log of the net
convenience yield measure as implied by equation (1.14).
Taken together, the non-arbitrage conditions linking the contemporaneous futures price
and spot price with future prices, suggest that oil futures and spot prices overshoot relative
to the expected spot price in the wake of upside (downside) fears. This implies that our
tail variation measures should forecast futures and spot market returns. Moreover, this
overshooting, reflected by the expected return, is larger for the spot price then for the futures
futures price. We address this hypothesis by direct forecasts and a structural VAR analysis
after presenting the estimation methodology and results for the tail variation measures.
1.3 Empirical Implementation
1.3.1 Estimation of the Variation Measures
As noted by Carr and Wu (2009), the implied total variation QV Qt,T , also known as the
variance swap rate, can be well approximated by a portfolio of out-of-the-money put and
3This comparative static thought experiment resembles the setting of Alquist and Kilian (2010), who
describe the effects from a change in the conditional variance of oil supply shocks. In their model, an increase
in the conditional variance of these shocks lead to a similar overshooting of the spot price. However, these
results are derived under the assumption of risk neutrality so that the futures price is an unbiased predictor
of the spot price. In contrast, our framework allows for an interaction of a time-varying risk premia with
the convenience yield and suggest that conditional on RJV Pt, LJV Pt, futures prices are not necessarily an
unbiased predictor.
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call options. For our calculation we follow the methodology for the CBOE Volatility Index
(VIX).4
Our specification of the jump tails follows Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2014). In par-
ticular, the jump distribution and intensity under the Q-measure are based on the semi-
parametric model
vQt (dx) =
(
φ+t × e−α
+
t x1(x>0) + φ
−
t × e−α
−
t |x|1(x<0)
)
dx. (1.17)
Relative to other existing models, this specification imposes only minimal restrictions on the
jump tail dynamics since (a) the left and right jump tails are allowed to differ and (b) the
level shift parameters φ± and the shape parameters α± are allowed to vary independently
over time.
The estimation of α+(α−) and φ+(φ−) is based on the observation that for (T − t) ↓ 0
and k ↑ ∞(k ↓ −∞)
erOt,T (K)
(T − t)Ft,T ≈
φ±t e
k(1±α±t )
α±t (α
±
t ± 1)
, (1.18)
where Ot,T (K) denotes the price of a call (put) option with strike K and k = log(K/Ft,T ).
This reflects the intuition that for close to maturity, deep OTM options the risks associated
with the diffusive part become negligible and their price therefore reflects jump risks.
From equation (1.18) it follows that the ratio of two OTM options does not depend on
φ±t , leading to the natural estimator suggested by Bollerslev and Todorov (2013):
αˆ±t = argminα±
1
N±t
N±t∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣log( Ot,τ (kt,i)Ot,τ (kt,i−1)
)
(kt,i − kt,i−1)−1 − (1± (−α±))
∣∣∣∣, (1.19)
where Ot,τ is the time t price of an OTM option on the futures with log-moneyness k, N
±
t
denotes the total number of options used in the estimation and 0 < |kt,1| < ... < |kt,N±t |. In
practice we will pool options such that t refers to a given month which implicitly assumes
that α± is approximately constant during this period.
For a given α±, we then use equation (1.18) to estimate
φˆ±t = argminφ±
1
N±t
N±t∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣log( erτOt,τ (kt,i)(T − t)Ft−,τ
)
+ (±αˆ±t − 1)kt,i + log(αˆ±t ∓ 1) + log(αˆ±t )− log(φ±)
∣∣∣∣.
(1.20)
From the definition of the tail risk premia in equation (1.9) and our assumptions for the
4See the white paper on the CBOE website for details regarding the VIX methodology.
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large jumps dynamics in (1.17), it follows that for time to maturity T − t and threshold kt
RJV Qt,T = (T − t)φ+t e−α
+
t kt(α+t kt(α
+
t kt + 2) + 2)/(α
+
t )
3 and (1.21)
LJV Qt,T = (T − t)φ−t e−α
−
t kt(α−t kt(α
−
t kt + 2) + 2)/(α
−
t )
3. (1.22)
The Q tail measures are then computed by replacing the population quantities in (1.21) by
their estimates.
The estimation of the corresponding quantities under the objective measure are based
on high-frequency intraday data. We use the notation of Bollerslev and Todorov 2011b and
divide the trading day t into the [t, t+pit] overnight period and the [t+pit, t+1] active trading
period. Hence pit denotes the length of the close to open interval.
5 Dividing the effective
trading time in equally spaced intervals, we obtain n returns ∆t,if ≡ ft+pi+i−ft+pi+i−1, where
f denotes the logarithm of the futures price. We denote RVt the realized variation on day t,
which is consistently estimated by summing the squared intraday returns
RVt ≡
n∑
i=1
(∆t,if)
2 p→
∫ t+1
t+pit
σ2sds+
∫ t+1
t+pit
∫
R
x2µ(ds, dx). (1.23)
Realized jumps under the statistical measure are estimated using the threshold technique
first proposed by Mancini (2001). Under the threshold estimation, we first compute an es-
timate for the continuous part of the volatility, σt, and then filter out jumps by identifying
a threshold separating jumps that appear incompatible with the underlying normal distri-
bution. The truncation threshold for large jumps is time-varying and captures the effects
of well-described volatility clustering as well as intraday volatility. Out of the returns that
are identified as jumps, we select the large and medium-sized ones for the tail estimation.
The reader is referred to Appendix A regarding for further details regarding the estimation
procedure.
Due to the lack of observations for sufficiently large jumps under the statistical measure it
is infeasible to the estimate the same flexible jump tail specification as under the Q-measure.
Instead we follow Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b) in assuming that6
vPt =
(
(α−0 1x<0 + α
+
0 1x>0) + (α
−
1 1x<0 + α
+
1 1x>0)σ
2
t
)
vP(x)dx, (1.24)
where vP(x)dx is the time-invariant distribution of empirical jumps and the level parameters
5Although the trading hours are non-stochastic, it is convenient to treat pit as stochastic. The theoretical
derivations presented below are valid under mild conditions regarding the stochastic process for pit. See
Bollerslev and Todorov 2011b for details.
6Empirical evidence that the jump distribution is in the oil market is approximately proportional to the
continuous volatility is presented in Doran and Ronn (2008).
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α±0 and α
±
1 relate linearly to the time varying continuous volatility σ
2
t .
7
The estimation of the time invariant jump distribution draws on the insight by Bollerslev
and Todorov (2011a) that the tails of an arbitrary distribution are approximately distributed
according to a Generalized Pareto Distribution. Given our empirical jumps, the two param-
eters of the Generalized Pareto Distribution along with α0 and α1 are estimated seperately
for each tail via GMM as outlined in Appendix A.
1.3.2 Data Description
Our empirical analysis is based on light sweet crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) futures
and options.8 Crude oil derivatives are traded in extremely liquid markets and available
historical data goes back to the 1980s. Trading of oil futures started in April 1983 for
contracts with maturities up to three months, and for options on futures in November 1986.
For the estimation of the Q jump tails we use an option data set obtained from the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME group, formerly NYMEX) that contains all historical end-of-
the-day settlement prices.9 Conveniently these crude oil options are quoted for a variety of
strike prices and expiration dates - one for each calendar month of the year - thus ensuring a
sufficient number of short maturity deep OTM options for the empirical implementation of
our estimator. The derivation of the tail parameters formally relies on a decreasing time to
maturity (T − t) ↓ 0. We therefore only take the contract with the shortest time to maturity,
whenever the maturity is larger than 9 days. The last trading days of a given option contract
can be characterized by prizing abnormalities due to the lack of trading volume, which makes
it necessary to discard this data and resort to the first back contract for those days.10
In order to mitigate potential influences from the diffusive risk, we retain only OTM call
(put) options with at log-moneyness more than plus (minus) twice the maturity-normalized
Black-Scholes at-the-money implied volatility. We clean the data by discarding all options
with a settlement price of less than 3 cents and those violating the monotonicity condition
in the strike dimension. The dataset comprises daily data from December 1987 to December
2013. For the estimation of the jump tails we pool all clean deep OTM options for a given
7The specification for the jump tails under the P-measure is significantly more restrictive than the cor-
responding Q-measure specification. Empirically the P jump tails are dwarfed by the risk neutral analogues
and we will therefore only work with the more general Q-measures in the later part of this paper. The em-
pirical evidence for a significant difference in the expected jump tail variations under the different measures
are presented in the following section.
8The CME tickers for the futures and options is CL and LO, respectively.
9NYMEX crude oil options are American style. For short maturity, deep OTM options the difference
between European and American options is negligible, so we use the original options for the jump tail
estimation. For the computation of the expected quadratic variation under the Q-measure we convert the
option prices into corresponding European style values following Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987).
10This “cleaning procedure” is standard, see e.g. Trolle and Schwartz (2010) or Bollerslev and Todorov
(2011b).
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calendar month. This leaves us with 313 monthly sets of pooled option data with maturities
9-40 days.11
Our futures data comprises 5-minute intraday price quotes from Tickdatamarket. We
retain the future contracts corresponding to the option contracts used for the jump tail esti-
mation under the risk neutral measures in order to ensure an exact matching. After standard
data cleaning procedures our sample comprises 6,327 trading days.12 For the computation
of the realized measures we use the part of the day were trading was actively carried out
throughout the sample. Thus the first price observation is taken to be 10:00 (CST), and the
last price observation 14:30. This leaves us with 54 price observations for each trading day.
1.3.3 Empirical Tail Risk Measures
The estimates for the tail variation measures under Q implied by equation (1.21) require
a choice of the threshold kt that separates large from small jumps. Similar to Bollerslev,
Todorov, and Xu (2014) we allow kt to vary as a linear function of the implied volatility.
This form of time variation mimics the estimation procedure for the statistical jumps and
accounts for the idea that what is classified as an “extreme” event can differs with economic
conditions and corresponding market volatility. The following results are presented for the
threshold kt equal to three times the at-the-money Black-Scholes (BS) implied volatility.
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This specification of kt corresponds to a median threshold of 25 %.
The estimates for FIt are presented in figure (1.5). Most of the noticeable movements in
the series correspond to well known periods of oil price or aggregate uncertainty, such as the
1st Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, the financial crisis in 2008 and NBER recessions. Similar
intuitive results are presented in figure (1.5) for the individual tail measures, alongside the
risk neutral and statistical expected quadratic variations.
Similar to results from the equity index market presented by Bollerslev and Todorov
(2011b), we find that in the crude oil futures markets the P-tail distribution implied by the
futures data is dwarfed by the corresponding Q measures. The estimates presented in table
(1.1) indicate that on average, the statistical variation measure for the left tail is about 200
times smaller than the Q measure counterpart. The corresponding ratio for the right tail is
around 50 and also sufficiently small in order to conclude that changes in the tail premia are
almost entirely driven by movements in the tail variations under Q measure. Thus the tail
11The monthly pooling ensures a sufficient number of options for estimation throughout the sample. It
also has the advantage that potential monthly seasonalities are averaged out.
12The original sample constitutes 6519 trading days. Some days around Christmas, Thanksgiving and
July 4th feature irregular trading hours and were discarded.
13We also experimented with other thresholds, obtaining qualitatively similar results. Table (1.6) in
Appendix C displays the result for kt four times the at-the-money Black-Scholes implied volatility.
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Figure 1.1: This figure displays the difference between the tail measures, RJV Qt,T -LJV
Q
t,T , in
annualized form. The the tail measures are computed for the threshold kt = 3× BS implied
volatility. Shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
variation premia appear well approximated by the risk neutral variation measures only:14
RJV P (kt) ≈ −RJV Qt,T and (1.25)
LJV P (kt) ≈ −LJV Qt,T . (1.26)
Interestingly, this indicates that changes in the objective jump distributions play a minor
role in explaining the time variation in the size of the tail premia.15
A second important finding, reported in Appendix A, is that the statistical left and right
tail variation measures are approximately symmetric. The symmetry implies that in each
point of time, the conditional probabilities of a large upward jump is roughly equal to the
conditional probability of a large downward jump. Together with strong time variation of the
difference of RJV Qt,T and LJV
Q
t,T documented in figure (1.5), this provides additional evidence
that the tail risk premia are only loosely connected to the statistical tail variation measures.
On average, the variation risk premia for the left tail is much larger than the premia for
the right tail (table 1.1). This is consistent with commodity futures markets being in normal
“backwardation”, an idea first put forth by Keynes (1976). He postulated that producers
of the physical commodity that want to hedge their output will have to pay a risk premium
for speculators that take on the matching long positions in futures markets. Accordingly,
speculators will demand a larger premium for their exposure to downside tail risk.
14A similar approximation empirically holds for the equity market. As Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2014)
point out, this conveniently avoids peso-type estimation problems.
15There is a similar finding for the equity index market. See e.g. Bollerslev and Todorov (2011a),
Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b) and Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2014).
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Mean SD AR(1)
LJV Qt,T 0.0233 0.0253 0.8444
RJV Qt,T 0.0081 0.0101 0.7730
LJV Pt,T 0.0001 0.0001 0.6698
RJV Pt,T 0.0002 0.0002 0.7103
OILVIX2 0.1353 0.1293 0.8374
VRP -0.0244 0.0741 0.1897
Table 1.1: Summary statistics for the monthly estimates of the tail variation measures and
the traditional variation measures. SD stands for the standard deviation, AR(1) for first
order autocorrelation. The sample period is 1987 to 2013, comprising 324 observations. All
measures are presented in annualized form. The tail variation measures are evaluated at
kt = 3 × Black-Scholes implied volatility.
The implied total variation QV Qt,T is computed using all OTM options on a given day.
For comparability with the tail measures, the monthly series we present in figure (1.5) is
calculated by taking the average over the respective calendar month. In the computation of
the realized total variation we also account for the overnight returns. The contribution of the
squared overnight returns to the entire daily observation, pit, is about 50% on average.
16 We
compute the daily series by an appropriate scaling of the intraday realized variance RVt and
obtain the monthly series by averaging over days.17 Our estimates of V RPt are then based
on the difference between the expected quadratic variation under the Q-measure and the
realized variation for the respective month.18 Over our sample period, V RPt is about -2%.
This figure right between the numbers of Trolle and Schwartz (2010), who report an average
premium of almost -3% over the 1996 - 2006 sample period and Kang and Pan (2013), who
report a premium of −1.65% for a sample period slightly shorter than ours.
For a threshold of kt = 3 × BS-implied volatility used here, the sum of the two tail
premia is on average about 3% and slightly larger than the absolute value of the average
V RPt. Of the total V RPt, about E(RJV
Q)/E(V RPt) = 33% come from the right tail and
about E(LJV Q)/E(V RPt) = 94% from the left tail. This suggests that the entire variance
risk premium is due to compensation for tail variations, while variations due to continuous
16This number is larger than then the average contribution of the squared overnight to the daily volatility,
see e.g. Ahoniemi and Lanne (2013). Part of this is due to the relatively small active trading window we are
considering for the realized measures in the previous section. For additional details the reader is referred to
Appendix A.
17Since there is no consensus in the literature, we experimented also with different forms of the scaling
the contributions of the overnight returns. The level of the average variation presented in this section is of
course not affected by the scaling, while the results for the monthly series used for forecasting in the next
sections are qualitatively similar.
18This obviously differs from the definition of V RPt which is based on the expectation of the realized
variation under the P-measure rather than the ex-post realized variation. For the unconditional estimates
tabulated here this distinction does not matter if we assume that the expectation error is zero.
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FIt FIt−1 FIt−2 FIt−3
rS,t 0.1426** -0.0319 -0.119** -0.148***
(0.0552) (0.0558) (0.0555) (0.0594)
rF,t 0.2117*** 0.0491 -0.0462 -0.1002*
(0.0545) (0.0557) (0.0558) (0.0562)
Table 1.2: Contemporaneous and 1-3 months spot return (rS,t) and futures return (rF,t)
correlation with FIt ≈ RJV Q − LJV Q. The estimates are based on monthly observations
from 1988 to 2013.
price movements and small jumps earn no or even a small positive premium.
In order to investigate how the tail premia interact with the spot prices, we also document
the correlations of the relative movements in the premia - captured by the fear index FIt
- with current and future spot returns. Table (1.2) shows that the contemporaneous spot
and future returns and FIt are positively correlated, while this correlation turns negative
for future spot and futures returns. Thus, these prices seem to exhibit an “overshooting” in
the wake of large upside risks, allowing the price to decrease over the subsequent periods.
We will address this issue more carefully in the next section where we discuss the forecasting
properties of our indicators.
It is also interesting to see how the estimated jump intensities relate to the futures risk
premium due to large jumps. Using our separate estimates for the left and the right tails
under the respective measure, we obtain this premium through equation (1.5). Similar to
our results from the tail variation premia, the futures premia for the left tail tends to be
larger than that for the right tail. The average of the (continuously compounded) futures
premium due to large jumps period is 3.7% over our sample period. In comparison, the
average (continuously compounded) total futures risk premium computed from the 1st back
contract is 7.5%, suggesting that about half of the short maturity futures risk premium is
due to tail risk.
1.4 Predictability of Futures and Spot Returns
1.4.1 Predictive Regression Framework and Control Variables
This section presents new predictability evidence of the tail premia for crude oil spot and
futures returns. The baseline forecasts are performed in-sample, while cross-validation tech-
niques are employed for the out-of-sample robustness check. If the premia capture oil market
agents’ attitudes toward tail risks, we would expect a large upside (downside) tail variation
risk premium to be associated with relatively small (large) returns. We test this hypothesis
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in a regression framework for predictability of futures and spot returns of the form
rj,t+i = β0,i + β1,i · LJV Qt,T + β2,i ·RJV Qt,T + Controls′t · β3,i + t,i, j = {S, F}, (1.27)
where rS,t+i is the ith-month ahead spot return and rF,t+i is the ith-month ahead futures
return, while LJV Qt,T and RJV
Q
t,T represent the left and the right tail premia, respectively,
approximated by Q-measure variations. The vector Controlst include both macroeconomic-
financial variables and crude oil market specific variables that are potential predictors of
commodity spot and futures returns (see e.g. Bessembinder and Chan 1992; Hong and Yogo
2012). For i > 1, we employ overlapping regressions in order to enhance the efficiency of our
estimates, using robust Newey-West standard errors so as to account for the autocorrelation
in the residuals induced by the overlap. The lag length for the computation of the standard
errors is chosen twice the length of the overlap.
We first describe the set of oil market specific control variables. As suggested by the recent
literature, we include the estimated V RPt. We compute V RPt as the difference between the
lagged expected variation under the risk neutral and the actual variation in period t as
suggested in Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) and as described in the previous section.
For additional robustness analysis, we also include the contemporaneous expectation QV Qt
and the contemporaneous realized variation separately. The oil market specific variables
further include changes in oil inventories, obtained as the monthly storage level from the
web site of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and open interest growth.
The computation of the open interest variable is based on the open interest of futures and
options combined obtained from the CFTC website and computed as the 12-month growth
rates taking geometric averages as suggested by Hong and Yogo (2012). Finally, we include
the slope of the term structure as measured by the net ratio of the current spot price over
the 1st back futures contract.19
We control for macroeconomic conditions by including the short term interest rate, com-
puted as the yield of a 3-month T-Bill, and the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions
Index (ADS) published by the Federal Bank of Philadelphia. The index is based on may
economic indicators in the U.S. and a higher value is associated with better economic condi-
tions. Since crude oil prices might be also driven by global rather than US-specific factors,
we include the Real Activity Index developed in Kilian (2009). The other variables include
the yield spread, computed as the difference between Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate bond
yields and the CBOE VIX, a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
19We also experimented with other definitions of the slope of the term structure, e.g. the net ratio of the
spot price with the 3rd back futures contract and the net ratio of the first two futures contracts, yielding
almost identical results.
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1.4.2 Forecasting Results
We first discuss the forecasting results for crude oil futures returns, presented in columns (5) -
(8) of table (1.3). For all regressions, the coefficients have the expected sign. A relatively high
right tail premium is associated with negative futures returns, and the left tail premium with
positive returns. For the model without controls, all coefficients are statistically significant
at the 5% significance level and most at the 1% significance level. This confirms our intuition
that the tail risk premia are associated with a substantial change in the oil futures premia.
The results are robust to the inclusion of standard predictors of crude oil prices. The
only exception is the noticeable rise in the standard error for the left tail premium in the
three month horizon regression, which renders the coefficient statistically insignificant at
conventional significance levels. This indicates certain degree of correlation with some of the
predictor variables, which is also noted through the increasing coefficient for the coefficient
associated with the right tail premium when controlling for the other predictors. Jointly,
the tail premia are always significant at the 1% significance level as measured through F-
test. The adjusted R2 is 3.7% for the three month horizon and and 6.8% for the six month
horizon regression, which amounts to almost one fourth of the predictability associated with
all regressors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables rS,t+3 rS,t+3 rS,t+6 rS,t+6 rF,t+3 rF,t+3 rF,t+6 rF,t+6
L3.RJV Qt,T -7.70*** -10.13*** -5.27*** -9.54***
(2.044) (2.254) (1.872) (2.364)
L3.LJV Qt,T 2.56*** 1.85* 1.59*** 1.49
(0.510) (1.059) (0.546) (1.025)
L6.RJV Qt,T -11.03*** -16.83*** -9.76** -18.32***
(2.845) (2.901) (3.875) (3.539)
L6.LJV Qt,T 5.27*** 3.80*** 3.47*** 3.99***
(0.698) (1.413) (0.860) (1.460)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 0.0877 0.2371 0.1419 0.3131 0.0374 0.1634 0.0685 0.2827
Obs. 321 283 318 282 321 283 318 282
Wald test (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.005 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.3: Forecasting results for i = 3 and i = 6 months. The dependent variable rS,t+i
stands for spot returns, rF,t+i for futures returns. Wald test stands for an F-test of the joint
significance of RJV Qt,T and LJV
Q
t,T . The estimation period is 1987 - 2013. The differences in
the number of observations is due to data availability for the control variables.
We now describe the forecasting results for crude oil spot returns, presented in columns
(1) - (4) of table (1.3). For all regressions, the coefficients associated with the tail premia
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have similar sizes to those of the futures regressions. Again, the significance of the coefficient
for the left tail premium in the three month regression when the other predictor variables
are is slightly decreased due to the rise in the standard error relative to the model with-
out predictors. For all other regressions, the individual coefficients are significant at the 1%
significance level. Again, a joint F-test for the premia allows us to reject the null of no signif-
icance at all conventional significance levels for all regressions. The adjusted R2s associated
with the spot return regressions are much larger than those for futures returns. At the three
month horizon, the tail measures account for about 9% of the variability in the spot return,
while this number increases to 14% at the six month horizon, constituting almost half of the
in-sample variability explained by all regressors.20 Thus the tail risk measures have strong
predictability for futures and spot price returns in the expected direction, and, judging from
the fit of the regression, this predictability is larger for the spot than for the futures price.
This is consistent with the idea that fears about large oil price fluctuations affect both the
futures and the spot price, and that the convenience yield moves in the same direction as
the futures risk premium.
For forecasting purposes, a high R2 is not always indicative of a good model since it is al-
ways possible to increase the in-sample fit by adding additional regressors without improving
out-of-sample forecasting power. In order to safeguard against a potential in-sample-overfit,
we perform an out-of-sample cross-validation. Our cross-validation procedure uses the entire
series as both in-sample and out-of-sample data. Specifically, we run repeating regressions
using a single return observation from the original sample as the validation data, and the
remaining observations as the training data.21 This is repeated until each observation in
the sample is used once as the validation data, so that finally every return observation was
treated “out-of-sample” once. The cross-validation statistics is based on the mean squared
prediction error, hence lower values indicate a better fit. In order to evaluate the predictive
out-of-sample performance of our predictors we estimate the forecasting model presented
in equation (1.27) in the previous section first including the tail premia and then exclud-
ing it. The results are displayed in table (1.7) in Appendix C. Including the tail premia
as predictive regressors reduces the cross validation statistics substantially for all models
considered, indicating that their forecasting power is not only due to in-sample properties.
Importantly, the out-of-sample MSPE for the model including LJV Qt,T and RJV
Q
t,T without
additional control variables as regressors is always lower than the forecast assuming a con-
20We also assessed whether the tail risk measures posses incremental forecasting power with respect to
the control variables. This is indeed the case: The incremental adjusted R2 for the regressions including all
variables in comparison with regressions using the control variables only is about 10% and 11% for futures
and spot returns, respectively, for the six months horizon and about 5% and 6% for the three months horizon.
21We assure that these returns are completely non-overlapping with the remaining returns by leaving an
out of sample window of ±4 months around the respective return for i = 3 months and ±7 months for i = 6
months.
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stant return and the no-change forecast. In contrast, the model including only the control
variables displays a higher out-of-sample MSPE against the no-change forecast for the spot
price regressions, suggesting that the R2 related to these variables is driven at least in part
by in-sample overfitting.
1.4.3 Risk or Fear: Where does the predictability come from?
After having provided evidence for the forecasting power of our novel predictors, we now
turn to the question whether the premia a compensation for potential risks or rather de-
scribe the oil market’s attitudes towards risks. From the definition of FIt it follows that for
approximately symmetric jump tails under the P measure,
FIt =
1
T − t
[(
EPt (LJV
P
t,T )− EQt (LJV Qt,T )
)− (EQt (LJV Pt,T )− EQt (LJV Qt,T ))]
≈ 1
T − t
[
EQt (LJV
Q
t,T )− EQt (RJV Qt,T )
]
. (1.28)
In this case, as shown by Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2014), FIt will be largely void
of risk compensation associated with the temporal changes in the jump intensities and is
therefore naturally interpreted as a proxy of oil market fears. The notion of a “fear index” is
also warranted because the premia are not directly related to asymmetries in future actual
jump probabilities. In table (1.8) presented in Appendix C we show that the Q tail variation
measures do not display any forecasting power for the realized jump variation beyond that
predicted by symmetric measures such as the realized variance. In contrast, the forecast-
ing results shown in table (1.4) indicate that the return predictability through our novel
predictors is mainly driven by its asymmetry. Here we use the 6 month ahead forecasting
regression and decompose the tail measure in their difference, FIt and a level component
RJV Qt,T + LJV
Q
t,T . Using these variables as single regressors, displayed in columns (2) and
(3), shows that the regression with the fear index as a predictor variable yields a statistically
significant coefficient that indicates that upside fears are associated with decreasing spot
price returns. The R2 for this regression is almost 10%, while the R2 for the regression with
the tail risk level measure is less than 2% and yields an statistically insignificant coefficient.22
These results are consistent with the idea that time variation in the effective risk aversion
of oil market participants is an important driver of the short run fluctuation of the price
of oil. Taken together, the results presented in this section are confirm evidence for the
predictability of both futures and spot returns by our novel risk indicators.
22Including both the fear index and the level component jointly yields, as in column (4), obviously yields
the same R2 as the baseline.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables rS,t+6 rS,t+6 rS,t+6 rS,t+6
L6.RJV Qt,T -11.03***
(2.626)
L6.LJV Qt,T 5.27***
(0.615)
L6.FIt -3.84*** -8.15***
(0.569) (1.559)
L6.(RJV Qt,T + LJV
Q
t,T ) 1.01 -2.88***
(0.881) (1.099)
Adj. R2 0.1419 0.0950 0.0180 0.1419
Obs 318 318 318 318
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.4: Forecasting results for 6 month oil spot returns, denoted by rS,t+6. The estimation
period is 1987 - 2013.
1.4.4 VAR Estimates on the Impact of the Oil Fear
In this section, we compare our forecasting results with estimates from VAR models, where
we include FIt as a directional measure of oil market uncertainty. The VAR framework
has shown useful for structural analysis of oil price shocks and forecasting the real price
of oil (Kilian 2009; Baumeister and Kilian 2012). Building on the reduced form version of
the model proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2014), the variables in the estimation order are
oil production (in percentage changes), the global real activity proposed by Kilian (2009),
changes in crude oil inventories, FIt, the six month futures spread (CYt,6) and the nominal
price of oil (in percentage changes).23 In a second exercise, we replace the price of oil by the
percentage change of the first back futures contract.24 The identification of shocks to FIt is
based on a Cholesky-decomposition of the reduced form errors. Including production, real
activity and inventory as the first variables in the VAR ensures the impact of these variables
is already controlled when looking at the impact of shocks to FIt on the oil and futures
price.25 Given the tradeoff between overparameterization and allowing for sufficient lags to
account for business cycle effects, we estimate the VAR with 12 lags.
Figure (1.2) plots the impulse response function of oil spot prices and the six months
futures spread to a shock in the oil fears index. Oil spot prices react with an instantaneous
23Expressing the price of in log percentage changes ensures that the cumulative impulse responses reflect
the percentage change of oil over the entire period.
24The calculation of the percentage change of the first back futures contract is always based on the same
contract for a given period. However across periods, contracts will differ.
25As pointed out by Kilian and Murphy (2014), inventory will in general also adjust quickly in response
to uncertainty shocks. The results presented here are robust to a change in the ordering of the variables
such that FIt is included before inventories.
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Figure 1.2: Responses of the spot price of oil and the six months futures spread to a one
standard deviation shock. The estimates are based on monthly data, 1987:1 - 2012:6. Dashed
lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
increase of about 2%, and a gradual reversion to previous levels over the following months.
The 90 % confidence intervals are plotted around this, highlighting that this impact is
statistically significant over the first months. The six months futures spread reacts with
an immediate, yet much smaller decline and a faster reversion to previous levels. Instead,
the response of inventories to fear shocks, presented in Appendix C, do not provide any
evidence for a systematic reaction of inventories to FIt.
26 These effects are consistent with
the idea that shocks to upside (downside) fears are associated with an immediate increase
(decrease) of the price of oil that is due to the combination of an increase (decrease) in the
net convenience yield and an decrease (increase) in the risk premium. As such, changes in
relative uncertainty do not require an immediate response of inventory in order to display
discernible effects on prices.
For comparison, the responses of spot prices to a shock to real activity and and implied
oil price volatility are presented in figure (1.3). The reaction of the price of oil to real activity
appears more persistent, yet smaller on impact, whereas the estimated effect of the implied
oil price volatility shocks is largely insignificant. The results are consistent with the idea
that changes in the relative uncertainty about upside and downside fears are an important
driver of short run fluctuations in oil prices and futures returns.
26This might also be an indication of the redundancy of inventories when the futures spread is included.
I thank Christiane Baumeister for the comment.
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Figure 1.3: Responses of the spot price of oil to shocks in real activity and the option implied
variance, OILVIX2. The estimates for the responses to the implied variance are based on a
VAR model that contains the same ordering as described in the text and OILVIX2 instead
of FIt. The estimates are based on monthly data, 1987:1 - 2012:6. Dashed lines represent
90% confidence intervals.
1.5 Interaction with the Macroeconomy
1.5.1 Oil and Aggregate Uncertainty
Thus far, we have treated the oil risk factors in isolation from the aggregate asset uncer-
tainty. In this section we address their interaction. A recent strand of literature, building on
Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), has shown that the variance risk premium embedded
in stock market index options and futures is a suitable measure of aggregate uncertainty.
This work has been extended by Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b) and Bollerslev, Todorov,
and Xu (2014), suggesting that a substantial fraction of the variance risk premium and its
forecasting power for stock market and portfolio returns is due to the aggregate “fears” as
measured through the stock market fear index. This raises the question whether the aggre-
gate risk measures proposed by these authors predicts oil spot and future prices beyond the
oil risk measures proposed in this paper. Table (1.9) in Appendix D shows that the oil and
stock market tail variation measures are indeed highly correlated.27 The left tail oil variation
measure LJV Qt,T and the stock market fear index FIt,SPX exhibit the highest correlation of
65%.
In table (1.10) in Appendix D we present the forecasting results for six months futures
27The stock market variance risk premium V RPt,SPX and fear index FIt,SPX are based on S&P 500
index options and futures following the methodology of Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2014) for the years
1996 to 2013. I would like to thank Lai Xu for providing the data on the S&P 500 fear index and Marek
Raczko for providing the data on the S&P 500 variance risk premium.
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and spot price returns, respectively. The aggregate fear index and variance risk premium
appear to contain some explanatory power for the 6 month spot price return regression,
with an R2 of about 5%.28 However, this effect is completely dominated by the oil specific
tail risk variation measures, implying that the oil specific measures already entail relevant
information from the aggregate measures. On a more general level these results also suggest
that time-varying disaster fears embedded in option prices on individual assets, not only on
market indexes, convey important information on individual premia beyond that implied by
the market.
In addition to these results, we also address the question whether LJV Qt,T and RJV
Q
t,T
predict stock market returns. We find little evidence of a stable relationship, since these
forecasting results depend crucially on the sample period, in particular on the inclusion of
data during and after the financial crises. Table (1.11) in Appendix D shows that prior to
the outbreak of the financial crisis, a relatively high left tail variation measure was associated
with lower stock market returns, and a relatively high right tail variation with higher stock
market returns. However, extending the sample beyond the outset of the financial crisis this
relationship breaks down. These results - in terms of both the significance and signs of the
coefficients - are consistent with the idea that LJV Qt,T and RJV
Q
t,T aggregate different types
of uncertainty that are relevant for oil prices, e.g. oil supply and oil demand uncertainty,
that individually have a very distinct relationship with the aggregate stock market. Prior
to the financial crisis, the most notable event in terms of oil fears was the 1991 Gulf War
episode, which is clearly identified with supply risk (Alquist and Kilian 2010). On the other
hand, the financial crisis and its aftermath were associated mainly with uncertainty about
future demand for oil.29.
1.5.2 Oil Uncertainty and Real Activity
Bernanke (1983) and more recently Elder and Serletis (2010) and Jo (2014) pointed out
that uncertainty about oil prices, rather than the fluctuations per se, can have important
effects on real economic activity. In this section we investigate this hypothesis by using our
novel uncertainty measures to predict industrial production, which is available at a monthly
frequency.
Our regressions, presented in table (1.12) in Appendix D, indicate that the right tail
28The important predictor seems to be V RPt,SPX , a result that is consistent with the work of of Bollerslev,
Todorov, and Xu (2014) who show that V RPt,SPX−FIt,SPX is mainly associated with economic uncertainty,
while FIt,SPX captures attitudes toward risk.
29A different explanation for this result might be that oil derivative markets have only recently become
more integrated in the broader financial system, and that this integration went alongside fundamental changes
between the stock market and oil price relationship (Christoffersen and Pan 2014). We leave this hypothesis
for further research
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variation measure RJV Qt,T has a statistically significant impact on growth in industrial pro-
duction, while the left tail variation measure does not contain any additional information.
The incremental R2 from the inclusion of the right tail measure is about 5%, is robust to
the inclusion of oil market and aggregate control variables, and extends also to the 6 month
horizon.30 Intuitively, a large RJV Qt,T is always bad news for the oil importing economy be-
cause it can be due to (i) fears related to supply cuts (2) uncertainty about (global) economic
growth, both of which should have a negative effect on economic activity. In contrast, a large
premium for the left tail might be good news for the economy is the corresponding fears are
related to oil market specific events.
1.6 Conclusion
Oil prices are difficult to forecast and exhibit wild swings or “excess volatility” that are
difficult to rationalize by changes in fundamentals alone. We find that the jump risk premia
embedded on crude oil future options contain important information on oil market fears and
contribute to the explanation of oil price volatility. These premia are economically large,
vary substantially over time and significantly forecast crude oil futures and spot returns.
This result is robust after controlling for macro-finance and oil market specific variables, and
importantly, for time-varying aggregate disaster fear as measured by S&P500 option implied
tail risk. Instead, our oil uncertainty measures appears to conveniently aggregate oil price
uncertainty derived from different sources, e.g. oil supply and oil demand uncertainty, that
individually have a very distinct relationship with aggregate uncertainty.
We show that oil futures prices overshoot (undershoot) in the presence of upside (down-
side) tail fears in order to allow for smaller (larger) risk premia thereafter. Consistent with
the theory of storage, this overshooting (undershooting) is amplified for the spot price be-
cause of time varying benefits from holding inventory that work in the same direction. These
results are complementary to storage models using risk neutrality, and stress the importance
of time varying risk premia in explanations of large swings in oil prices. On a more general
level it is shown that time-varying disaster fears embedded in option prices on individual
assets, not only on market indexes, convey important information on the risk premia and
price dynamics of these assets.
30These results are confirmed by VAR estimates in a framework proposed by Bloom (2009). The results
are available upon request
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1.A Appendix: Computation of the Jump Measures
Estimating realized and expected jumps under the statistical mea-
sure
This sections provides further details on the estimation of the jump properties under the
statistical (objective) measure, which are computed from data on 5-minute intraday returns.
We use the notation of Bollerslev and Todorov (2011b) and divide the trading day t into the
[t, t+pit] overnight period and the [t+pit, t+ 1] active trading period, comprising n+ 1 = 54
price observations. Denoting ∆t,if ≡ ft+pi+i − ft+pi+i−1, where f denotes the logarithm of
the futures price, we have for a suitable threshold αt,i
n∑
i=1
(∆t,if)
2 p→
∫ t+1
t+pit
σ2sds+
∫ t+1
t+pit
∫
R
x2µ(ds, dx) and (1.29)
n∑
i=1
(∆t,if)
2 1|∆t,if≤αt,i|
p→
∫ t+1
t+pit
σ2sds ≡ CVt. (1.30)
We allow the truncation levels αt,i to vary with both the daily and the intraday volatility
following Bollerslev and Todorov (2011a). The time-of-day factor, TODj is then computed
via
TODj =
∑N
m=0(∆m(pi+n),if)
21|∆m(pi+n),if |<α¯∑N
m=0 |∆m(pi+n),if | < α¯
/
∑N
m=0
∑n
j=1(∆m(pi+n),if)
2∑N
m=0
∑n
j=1 1|∆m(pi+n),if | < α¯
, (1.31)
where α¯ = 3
√
Π · 0.5
√
1
N
∑N
m=0
∑n−1
j=1 |∆m(pi+n),jf ||∆m(pi+n),j+1f |. Given the time-of-day fac-
tor, the time-varying threshold αj,t is then computed as
αj,t = 3(
1
n
)0.49
√
CVt−n,tTODj. (1.32)
The dynamics of our empirical jumps in equation (1.24), require an estimate of vP.
This estimate is based on medium and large sized jump tails using the EVT proposed by
Bollerslev and Todorov (2011a). In particular, defining ψ+(x) = ex − 1 and ψ−(x) = e−x,
v+ψ (y) =
v(ln(y+1))
y+1
and v−ψ (y) =
v(−ln y)
y
, y > 0, the jump tail measures are
v¯±ψ (x) =
∫ ∞
x
v±ψ (u), (1.33)
with x > 0 for v¯+ψ (x), and x > 1 for v¯
−
ψ (x). Under the assumption that v¯
±
ψ belong the the
domain of attraction of an extreme value distribution (see Bollerslev and Todorov 2011b),
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it follows that
1− v¯
±
ψ (u+ x)
v¯±ψ
∼ G(u;σ±, ξ±), u > 0, x > 0, (1.34)
where G(u;σ±, ξ±) is the CDF of a generalized Pareto distribution with
G(u;σ±, ξ±) =
{
1− (1 + ξ±u/σ±)−1/ξ± , ξ± 6= 0, σ± > 0
1− e−u/σ± , ξ± = 0, σ± > 0. (1.35)
Now, for a large threshold tr±, the integrals corresponding to the jump tail measures
under P are a function of the parameter vector
Θ ≡ [σ±, ξ±, α±0 v¯±ψ (tr±), α±1 v¯±ψ (tr±)], (1.36)
which are estimated using the exact GMM framework suggested by Bollerslev and Todorov
(2011a). The moment conditions used for estimation are
1
N
N∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
φ±j (ψ
±(∆t,if)− tr±)1ψ±(∆t,if)>tr± = 0, j = 1, 2(1.37)
1
N
N∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
1ψ±(∆t,if)>tr± − α±0 v¯±ψ − α±1 ψ¯±(tr±)CVt = 0 (1.38)
1
N
N∑
t=2
(
n∑
i=1
1ψ±(∆t,if)>tr± − α±0 v¯±ψ (tr±)− α±1 v¯±ψ (tr±)CVt
)
CVt−1 = 0, (1.39)
where
φ±1 (u) = −
1
σ±
+
ξ±
(σ±)2
(
1 +
1
ξ±
)(
1 +
1 + ξ±u
σ±
)−1
and (1.40)
φ±2 (u) =
1
(ξ±)2
ln
(
1 +
ξ±u
σ±
)
− u
σ±
(
1 +
1
ξ
)(
1 +
ξ±u
σ±
)−1
(1.41)
are the scores associated with the log-likelihood function of the generalized Pareto distribu-
tion. Facing the trade off between a sufficient number of observations of medium and large
jumps on the one hand, and the approximation of the jump tails by the generalized Pareto
distribution on the other, our choice of tr± corresponds to a jump in the log price of ±1.2%.
In total, we detect 3266 (3756) positive (negative) jumps, out of which 134 (198) are above
the threshold. The large jumps, displayed in figure (1.4), seem to cluster and the occurrences
of positive and negative jumps appear relatively symmetric.
The parameter estimates for our specification of the statistical large jumps’ dynamics,
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Figure 1.4: Detected large jumps in the log price. The threshold is ±1.2%, the estimates are
based on 5-minute intraday futures data from 1988 to 2013.
presented in table (1.5) provide further evidence for this symmetry.
Left Tail Right Tail
Parameter Estimate St. Error Parameter Estimate St.Error
ξ− 0.3107 0.0707 ξ+ 0.3603 0.1054
100 · σ− 0.4317 0.0429 100 · σ+ 0.3446 0.0457
α−0 -0.1194 0.0059 α
+
0 -0.0906 0.0046
α−1 11.7926 0.4172 α
+
1 8.7404 0.3248
Table 1.5: Estimates for P tail parameters. The estimates are based on 5-minute intraday
futures data from 1988 to 2013.
1.B Appendix: Data and Empirical Measures
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Tail Risk and Traditional Volatility Measures
Figure 1.5: The figure on top displays the left tail (green) and right tail (blue) variation
measures under Q. The figure on the bottom displays the traditional measures EQt (QVt,T )
(dashed line) and V RPt ≡ EQt (QVt,T ) − RVt,T (red line). All measures are presented in
annualized form. The tail measures are computed for the threshold kt = 3× BS implied
volatility. Shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
Robustness to the choice of kt
Table (1.6) displays the estimated tail risk premia for a larger thresholds, kt = 4 × the at-
the-money Black-Scholes implied volatility and kt = 6.8 × the at-the-money Black-Scholes
implied volatility.
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Obs. Mean S.d.
kt = 4 × ATM Black-Scholes implied volatility
LJV Qt,T 324 0.0113 0.0130
RJV Qt,T 324 0.0032 0.0041
kt = 6.8 × ATM Black-Scholes implied volatility
LJV Qt,T 324 1.060 ·10−3 1.467 ·10−3
RJV Qt,T 324 0.188 ·10−3 0.334 ·10−3
Table 1.6: Summary Statistics for LJV Qt,T and RJV
Q
t,T based on pooled monthly data; evalu-
ated at kt = 4 × and kt = 6.8 × Black-Scholes implied volatility.
1.C Appendix: Predictability of Futures and Spot Re-
turns
Cross validation
Futures Spot
rF,t+3 rF,t+3 rF,t+6 rF,t+6 rS,t+3 rS,t+3 rS,t+6 rS,t+6
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No change forecast 30.5 - 55.0 - 34.3 - 59.7 -
With RJV Qt,T ,LJV
Q
t,T 29.1 26.7 48.9 41.0 33.0 33.6 50.8 57.1
Without RJV Qt,T , lJV
Q
t,T 29.8 28.1 51.8 46.7 33.9 35.8 52.2 65.2
Table 1.7: Cross validation statistics for forecasting models with and without RJV Qt,T and
LJV Qt,T . The dependent variablerF,t+3 stands for 3 month futures returns, rF,t+6 for six month
futures returns, rS,t+3 for three month spot returns and rS,t+6 for six month spot returns.
Each return is evaluated out of sample once, with a 7 (13 in the case of the 6 months
prediction) out-of-sample window around the corresponding return. The control variables
are those described in section 4. Each model is evaluated twice: Once including the the
predictors RJV Qt,T and RJV
Q
t,T , and once excluding them. A lower statistics indicates a lower
out-of-sample MSPE. Values are multiplied by 100. Sample period is 1989 - 2013.
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Forecasting empirical jump variations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Emp. LJV Emp. LJV Emp. RJV Emp. RJV
L.RV 2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L.RJV Qt,T -0.01 0.02*
(0.016) (0.011)
L.LJV Qt,T 0.01 -0.00
(0.004) (0.004)
Obs. 312 312 312 312
Adj. R2 0.44 0.46 0.27 0.28
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.8: Forecasting results for empirical jumps. Emp. LJV stands for the sum of squared
log returns from large negative jumps in the futures price, Emp. RJV stands for the sum
of squared log returns from positive negative jumps. RV 2 is the average monthly realized
variance.
1.D Appendix: Interaction with the Macroeconomy
Robustness to Aggregate Uncertainty and Fears
RJV Qt,T LJV
Q
t,T FIt,SPX V RPt,SPX
RJV Qt,T 1.00
LJV Qt,T 0.85 1.00
FIt,SPX 0.60 0.65 1.00
V RPt,SPX 0.48 0.62 0.37 1.00
Table 1.9: Correlation between monthly oil risk measures and monthly stock market uncer-
tainty measures. FIt,SPX is the fear index derived from S&P500 index options, V RPt,SPX
the variance risk premium derived from S&P500 index options and futures as described in
Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2014). The sample period is 1996:1 to 2013:8.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Variables rS,t+6 rS,t+6 rS,t+6 rS,t+6 rS,t+6 rF,t+6 rF,t+6 rF,t+6 rF,t+6 rF,t+6
V RPt,SPX 0.03* 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
FIt,SPX , 0.09** 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.036) (0.037) (0.049) (0.031) (0.030) (0.060)
RJV Qt,T -14.98* -14.33* -14.88** -13.91*
(7.902) (7.729) (7.125) (7.253)
LJV Qt,T 5.72*** 4.97*** 4.44*** 4.35**
(1.792) (1.815) (1.491) (1.731)
Adj. R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.06
Obs. 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.10: Forecasting results for six months oil futures and spot market returns. The
dependent variable rS,t+6 denotes the six months oil spot return, rF,t+6 six months futures
excess returns. RJV Qt,T and LJV
Q
t,T are the right tail oil variation measure and left tail oil
variation measure. FIt,SPX is the fear index computed from S&P 500 as proxied through
the left tail variation measure, suggested in Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu 2014. V RPt,SPX is
the variance risk premium computed from S&P 500 futures and options. The sample period
is 1996 - 2013.
Forecasting stock market returns
(1) (2)
1989 - 2013 1989 - 07/2008
Variables rMkt,t+6 rMkt,t+6
L6.RJV Qt,T -1.50 5.78***
(3.349) (1.409)
L6.LJV Qt,T 1.36 -3.84***
(1.075) (1.344)
Observations 294 229
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.11: Forecasting results for stock market returns. rMkt,t+6 is the six months market
excess return using CRSP data.
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Forecasting real activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables rIP,2 rIP,2 rIP,2 rIP,2
L2.RJV Qt,T -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.28**
(0.084) (0.070) (0.133)
l2.rIP,2 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24***
(0.057) (0.071) (0.066) (0.073)
L4.rIP,2 0.30*** 0.22** 0.22** 0.23**
(0.115) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093)
L6.rIP,2 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.085) (0.078) (0.075)
L2.rSPX,1 0.03***
(0.010)
L2.rWTI,1 0.00
(0.006)
L2.OILVIX2 0.00
(0.012)
L2.LJV Qt,T -0.01
(0.038)
Observations 316 316 316 316
Adj. R2 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.37
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.12: Forecasting results for industrial production growth. rIP,2 is the two month
growth rate of US industrial production, rSPX,1 is the one month stock market return,
rWTI,1 is the one month increase in the crude oil spot price, OILVIX2 is the option implied
oil market volatility.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Commodity Index
Investment in Commodity and Asset
Price Comovement
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, large financial entities such as pension, mutual and hedge funds have
assumed an increasingly important roles in commodity futures markets, and the connection
between commodity price movements and financial investor participation has spurred nu-
merous debates among academics and policy makers (Masters 2008; Hamilton 2009; Irwin,
Sanders, and Merrin 2009; Fattouh, Kilian, and Mahadeva 2013). Besides price volatil-
ity, another recent feature has drawn attention: the cross-market correlation between stock
and commodity price changes has grown significantly. Figure (2.1) in Appendix B displays
the rolling window estimation of the S&P 500 returns and two major commodity index
returns, and indicates the increased comovement, which seems to start prior to 2008 but
is most noticeable after the outbreak of the financial crises. Interestingly, this correlation
has not declined over the recent years. Similarly, UNCTAD (2011), Tang and Xiong (2010),
Maystre and Bicchetti (2012) and Lombardi and Ravazzolo (2013) document steady increases
in the correlations between equities and commodities at a variety of frequencies, including
intrasecond intervals, since 2004, with a particularly sharp increase after the collapse of
Lehman Brother in September 2008. Several of these authors suggest that this change is
related to the “financialization” of commodity markets, and that financial investors that
are active in both markets play a particular role in transmitting shocks from equity across
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different commodity markets during times of crises.1 Still, their analysis leaves unanswered
questions regarding the future persistence of the co-movements, and the particular role of
economic fundamentals and trading strategies by various market participants in explaining
this comovement.
The goal of this paper is to study the effects of the financialization of commodity future
markets on the joint distribution of commodity and equity prices. Along this line, this paper
makes two contributions to the existing literature: First, I formalize suggestive pieces of
argumentation put forward by several of the aforementioned authors and derive a stylized
model depicting a mechanism through which financial investment in “paper commodities”
impacts the joint distribution of commodity and stock prices. Second, using data from the
US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on futures positions held by financial
traders in agricultural commodity markets, I provide empirical evidence for spillover shocks
from equity to commodity markets through commodity index trading, a passive investment
style that holds and rolls over long futures contracts according to fixed rules and that has
experienced increased popularity over the recent decade.
The mechanism presented in the theoretical section relies on the importance of financial
investors for time varying risk premiums determining futures prices. The “Theory of Normal
Backwardation”, going back to Keynes (1976), proposes that commodity producers and
inventory holders that are hedging their output through the futures market must pay a risk
premium to speculators on the long side of the contracts in order to compensate them for
taking on non-diversifiable price risks. This implies that the futures price tends to be below
the corresponding expected spot price. The “Theory of Normal Backwardation” has found
empirical support by Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983), Chang (1985) and Bessembinder
(1992), among others. When a sufficiently large number of financial investors takes on long
positions in commodity futures in order to diversify their portfolio, or to hedge inflation
risks, this long hedging pressure can induce a diminishing effect on the risk premium.2
If diversifying investors represent a large fraction of futures market participants, their
portfolio choices establish direct links between futures risk premiums and other asset market
conditions. Hence, their demand for futures will generally vary with their perceived risks
of the outside portfolio. Importantly, the equilibrium futures price is a major determinant
for the optimal storage decision of risk averse inventory holders, who are naturally short on
commodity futures (Kawai 1983). A reduction of the financial demand of long futures will
increase the risk premium and result in lower equilibrium prices and therefore increase the
1Their analysis also indicates that the changes in correlation were structural and not a pure artifact of
heteroscedasticity that influences changes in correlations, as warned by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
2For example, Hamilton and Wu (2014) documents empirical evidence for significant changes in the level
and volatility of the risk premium in the oil futures market that coincide with an increasing importance of
commodity index investment in this market.
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cost of hedging for inventory holders, who in turn will reduce storage activity and increase
spot market supply. In order to understand the implications of the model, consider the
situation where the diversifying investors are affected by adverse shocks in the central market,
i.e. the equity market. Such a shock will affect the wealth of their portfolio, decrease
the demand for futures, and decrease the equilibrium futures price. Inventory holders will
react by decreasing inventory, current supply rises and spot prices fall, even if demand is
not affected by shocks. This mechanism relies on limits to perfect arbitrage in futures
markets, which have been well documented in recent studies, and has played a particularly
important role during the recent financial crisis (Hong and Yogo 2012; Acharya, Lochstoer,
and Ramadorai 2013).
The theoretical model indicates that the effect of shocks to the central asset market on
commodity prices through the depicted mechanism is particularly important when diversi-
fying investors play a large role in the futures market. In fact, the last decade has seen
a phenomenal increase in open interests of commodity futures and options, as depicted in
figure (2.2) in Appendix B for the case of oil. The figure also suggests that non-commercial
traders, i.e. traders who are not exposed to the physical commodities, were the main driver
of this change. As also noticed by Hamilton and Wu (2014), an important part of this
trend was caused by increased participation of commodity index traders (CITs), financial
investors that invest in so-called “index funds”. These funds intent to replicate movements
of the spot price of the commodity by taking on long position in a near futures contract and
rolling over the contract before its maturity in order to take a new long position in the next
contract. CITs are typically not interested in handling the commodities physically, which
gives index investment a speculative component. Irwin and Sanders (2011) indicate that
the important motives for index investment are portfolio diversification, along with hedging
of inflation risks and absolute returns. The portfolio diversification motive was popularized
by studies by investors and academics showing that commodity futures that are rolled over
on a regular basis could earn yields similar to those of stock returns, while their (histor-
ical) negative correlation with stock market returns provided additional benefits through
strategic portfolio diversification (Greer 2000; Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2004; Ambroseno
and Simpson 2008). Relaxation of regulation and the quest for returns after the dot-com
bubble made commodity derivatives, most of all individual futures and futures indexes, an
increasingly popular asset class. Parsons (2010), Vansteenkiste (2011) and Stoll and Wha-
ley (2010), among others, document the increased importance of CITs and other derivative
traders. Liu, Qiu, and Tang (2011) shows that investment in commodity futures indexes in
the US grew from about $ 15 billion in 2003 to over $ 200 billion in 2008, while Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin
and Robe (2014) suggests that the trading volume of the commodity futures market now
vastly outsizes the market for physical commodities in terms of of traded contracts and their
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value. Commodity index investing is often described as a “passive” investment strategy due
to the utilization of long-only and fully collateralized futures, and predetermined investment
rules that are invariant to fundamental market changes.
Using public data from the Commodity Index Trader Supplement of the U.S Commodity
Trading Futures Commission (CFTC), my analysis focuses on the role of CITs in 12 agri-
cultural markets for which the data is published. Under the CFTC classification, diversified
investors such as index funds, pension funds, and mutual funds represent a major fraction
of CITs, making this group of traders a particularly suitable candidate for the empirical
implications of my model. As seen in table (2.1) in Appendix C, index investments made
up to 40 % of the open interest in agricultural markets during the 2006 - 2011 period. My
empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between asset market returns as measured by
returns to the S&P 500, and position changes of CITs in these markets. I show that CITs
react consistently by increasing positions after positive stock market shocks. Consistent
with the implications of my theoretical model, the effect is particularly strong during the
recent financial crisis, and statistically significant. The effects are robust after controlling
for market specific and a variety of macroeconomic factors, and the empirical results also
indicate that these position changes are forecastable. This indicates that CITs might have
played an important part in transmitting stock market shocks to a variety of commodity
markets. Moreover, when the reaction of CITs to stock market changes is public knowledge,
commodity futures and spot prices might adjust fast due to (even limited) arbitrage; hence
passive financial investment might help to explain part of the increased comovement between
stock and commodity prices.
The remainder of this paper evolves as follows: section 2 reviews the related literature;
section 3 presents an equilibrium model of a commodity futures market that relates increased
financial investment to the joint distribution of commodity and equity prices. Sections 4
presents the empirical evidence for the cross-market linkages through CITs, and section 5
concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
As noticed by Hirshleifer (1990), derivative speculation can only have an effect on equilibrium
cash prices and quantities when there are financial frictions. Shleifer (1986) and De Long
et al. (1990) provide early evidence for downward-sloping demand in a variety of financial
markets, and the arguments have been extended to the futures markets in more recent studies
(see e.g. Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand 2009; Gromb and Vayanos 2010, and the literature
cited therein). Etula (2013) presents an equilibrium model in which limits to arbitrage arise
through Value-at-Risk constraints of risk neutral broker. His results indicate that the broker
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balance sheets’ exposure to risk forecast commodity future returns in the pre-2007 period. In
my model, investor’s arbitrage constraints are introduced in a similar fashion as in Acharya,
Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013), whose model setup I follow closely. Consistent with the
theoretical model, these authors show that producers’ risk aversion as measured by producers’
default risk forecasts futures returns, spot prices, and inventories in oil and gas market data
from 1980-2006, and the component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with
producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. An important extension
of my work is that I explicitly take into account cross-market linkages, and show how these
links affect the joint distribution of commodity and asset prices. My work is also closely
related to Liu, Qiu, and Tang (2011), who use a model of heterogeneous financial investors
that hold a diversified portfolio to show how the demand for financial assets affects futures
markets and commodity cash prices. Their model differs from mine as it focuses on the
(exogenous) convenience yield, and does not model the demand for physical commodities
explicitly.
A variety of studies have arose in the connection to the effects of commodity index in-
vestors and other financial players. The main focus of existing studies relates to the impacts
the futures risk premium, which is also an important component of my theoretical model.
However, my model includes also the the relationship futures and spot returns, which con-
stitutes an extension to these studies. Singleton (2013) finds that a variety of measures,
including a 13-week change in index-fund holdings imputed from the Supplemental Com-
mittments of Traders report, could help predict weekly and monthly returns on crude oil
futures contracts over September 2006 to January 2010. His results are consistent with lim-
ited arbitrage that arises through the interplay between imperfect information about real
economic activity of commercials and speculators.3 Sanders and Irwin (2011b) finds no dis-
cernible effect of weekly net positions of swap dealers on the forecastability of returns on
14 different commodity futures contracts over 2006-2009. Sanders and Irwin (2011a) inves-
tigates grain commodities with proprietary CFTC data on commodity index traders and
finds some predictability for soybeans, but not for other grains. Stoll and Whaley (2010)
use the public Supplement for Index Traders and document small effects from changes in
the long positions of commodity index traders for weekly commodity returns predictability
during 2006-2009. Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin and Robe (2014), using a non-public dataset, do not find
significant price impacts from index investors, but show that the correlations between the
returns on investable commodity and equity indices increase amid greater participation by
hedge funds. They also argue that hedge funds activity could strengthen cross market link-
ages, and that “their exit from satellite markets (such as emerging markets or commodity
3However, these results are not robust to extending the sample period by only two more years (Hamilton
and Wu 2015).
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markets) after a major shock in a central asset market (such as the U.S. equity market) could
in theory bring about cross-market contagion” (p.2, Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin and Robe 2014). Lombardi
and Van Robays (2011) argue that financial agents such as index investors might not base
their futures demand on their expectation about future fundamentals, but rather for rea-
sons of broader portfolio diversification. An index fund, for example, might want to offer
their customers an exposure to oil price risk, and place themselves in a long position of
the futures market irrespective of their current expectations. The prevalence of uncertainty
among too many traders can overwhelm the arbitrageurs’ willingness to take on risky po-
sitions and impact the future price. In a more recent study, Buyuksahin and Robe (2011)
provide empirical evidence that the correlation between stock market and energy futures
returns has increased due to financial investment in “paper” commodities. In my theoretical
model, I formalize these ideas by looking at the hedging and output decisions of risk averse
firms. From standard hedging literature the firms’ decision about future commodity output
is closely related to the futures price (Kawai 1983; Danthine 1978). By modeling an spec-
ulator’s investment strategy, I combine Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin and Robe (2014)’s and Lombardi and
Van Robays (2011)’s argumentation with the firm’s output decision and show that under
certain assumptions, futures market speculation will change current and future spot prices
based to the non-speculation benchmark. Moreover, when commodity speculation is part of
a broader portfolio strategy, investment decisions can link commodity and traditional asset
markets systematically. My empirical results are also nicely consistent with those of Gao and
Suess (2011), who suggest that their indicator of investor sentiments, that includes measures
of stock market volatility, among others, is able to forecast commodity future returns.
Since the first draft of this study in the beginning of 2012, several studies have investigated
the relationship between index investment and commodity future returns. Hamilton and Wu
(2015) find that CIT positions in agricultural futures markets do not help to predict futures
returns for these commodities, a results that casts some doubts on the mechanism portrait
in the theoretical section. These results stand in contrast to the suggestion by Hamilton
and Wu (2014) who document diminishing but increasingly volatile futures risk premia in
the crude oil futures market, a finding “consistent with the claim that index-fund investing
has become more important relative to commerical hedging in determining the structure
of crude oil futures risk premia over time.” While an implication the theoretical model
presented here is that the (relative) number of positions, and not the notional exposure used
by Hamilton and Wu (2015) should be a predicting variable, these results warrant further
investigation. Further, Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2014), based on non-public data, show
that “financial traders reduced their net long positions during the crisis in response to market
distress”. Their empirical framework is similar to the one proposed in this paper; instead
of using stock market returns in order to predict position changes of different trader groups,
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these authors use volatility as a proxy for market distress.
2.3 A Model of Commodity Futures Market with Fi-
nancial Investment
I present a two-period model of commodity spot and futures price determination that in-
cludes optimal inventory management and hedging demand, similar to the models of Kawai
(1983) and Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013). Their setup features (partial) out-
put hedging of commodity producers and speculators that are compensated for taking on
commodity price risk. The novelty of the model is the consideration of a second type of
speculators that invest in commodity futures in order to diversify their portfolio, and their
effect on the equilibrium outcomes. These speculators can be thought of large pension or
mutual funds that have entered commodity index investment over the last decade.
Commodity demand and asset prices
In my model of the economy I consider a two periods, denoted by t = 0 and t = 1, and three
markets: a commodity spot market for each period, and a futures market that opens in period
zero. Consumers’ behavior is captured by the inverse demand function for commodities:
St = ω
At
Qt
, (2.1)
where St is the commodity spot price in period t, Qt is the consumption of the commodity
good and ω is a preference parameter. At is exogenous and stochastic, and the shocks to At
summarize the various factors that affect the demand for commodities (e.g. technological
changes in production). In particular, I assume that At is composed of a deterministic part,
denoted A, and a stochastic shock, D,t:
At = A+ D,t. (2.2)
A further source of randomness in this economy are asset prices (also referred to as stock
prices), denoted Pt, that are assumed to follow a random walk:
Pt = Pt−1 + P,t. (2.3)
I assume the existence of a joint distribution for the random innovations D,t and P,t
which are both mean zero and a generic covariance matrix that defines σ2D, the variance
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of the shocks to the demand curve, σ2P , the variance of asset prices and the covariance
of the shocks σD,P . This distribution can be viewed as a reduced form expression of an
underlying structural shock (e.g. productivity) that affects asset prices and commodity
demand simultaneously.
In the market for commodity futures, agents can trade an unrestricted quantity x of
commodity futures in period 0. Futures are contracts that specify a reference price F , which
is then compared to the spot price in period 1, S1. At maturity, the holder of a long (short)
contract, characterised by x > 0 (x < 0) is then paid the difference between the contracted
futures price and the actual spot price, S1−F (F − S1). Initially, future trading is costless,
but the contracts have to be honoured in period 1.
Producers
Producing firms are competitive with a mass normalized to NP . Output per individual firm
in both periods is fixed and given by g0 and g1, respectively, but in period 0, managers can
decide to store a certain amount i.4 I assume that storage is costless. Then, using capital
letters to denote aggregate quantities, aggregate supply in period 0 is given by G0 − I,
while aggregate supply in period 1 is G1 + I. Additionally, the managers can also agree
on a number hp of futures contracts, that specificy the delivery/acceptance of the relevant
quantity of commodities in period 1 for a price F that is agreed on in period 0 (if hp is
negative, the firm promises to deliver, i.e. it goes short; vice versa if hp is positive, the firm
goes long). Hence the firm’s expected profits are given by:
ΠP = S0(g0 − i) + S1(g1 + i) + hp(S1 − F ). (2.4)
When the managers are risk averse with a mean-variance utility function, the maximization of
their wealth is equal to the maximization of E(ΠP )− γP2 V ar(ΠP ), where γP is the coefficient
of constant risk aversion and V ar referes to the conditional variance based on period 0
information. In the absence of stock outs (i > 0), from the first order conditions with
respect to the inventory holdings and the futures contracts, we get:5
i = −g1 − hp + E0(S1 − F )
γPσ2
(2.5)
hp = −g1 − i+ E0(S1 − S0)
γPσ2
, (2.6)
4Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013) argue that supply might be fixed in the short run because
it is very expensive to adjust production.
5Note that I do not take into account the possibility of stock-outs in my model. A suitable extension
would related the model to the ”Theory of Storage”, as noted by Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013).
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where σ2 is the variance of the spot price in period 1 given t = 0 information. Equation
(2.5) indicates that inventory is positively related to short hedging, −hp and decreasing in
the next periods’ output g1. The term
E(S1−F )
γP σ2
represents a speculative component: when
the risk premium, E(S1−F ), is large, inventory holders are more likely to increase unhedged
inventory. Likewise equation (2.6) indicates that short hedging is equal to the quantity sold
in period 1, and a speculative component that depends on the risk premium. We also can
see that F = S0 in equilibrium. Intuitively, both the current spot price and the futures price
provide the inventory holder with riskless profits, and riskless arbitrage would be possible
if the equality does not hold. This also implies that changes in the futures price will be
reflected by simultaneous changes in the first periods spot price.
Traditional Speculators
The risk averseness of producers induces activities by arbitrage speculators who assume open
positions in futures and thus provide the necessary liquidity in the futures market. Without
loss of generality, their mass is normalized to one. Following Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand
(2009) and Etula (2013), investors are risk neutral, but face Value-at-Risk and/or margin
constraints. In the case of the traditional speculators, such constraints can be motivated
by limited collateral, that is necessary to make their contracting credible. As in Acharya,
Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013), I use a reduced form approach to model the constraints
and assume that the constraint is proportional to the variance of the speculator’s position
hA. When speculators act competitively and maximize the expected income in period 1
subject to the constraint, the objective function to be maximized is
hAE0(S1 − F )− γA
2
V ar0[hA(S1 − F )], (2.7)
where hA is the number of contracted futures and γA indicates the severity of the margin
constraint. The optimal number of contracts is then given by
hA =
E0(S1 − F )
γAσ2
, (2.8)
where σ2 is the conditional variance of the spot price in period 1. Equation (2.8) indicates
that in the case of normal backwardation, i.e. when F < E0(S1), the speculators assume
long positions. The optimal amount of contracts is increasing in the risk premium E(S1−F ),
and negatively related to the severity of the arbitrage constraint and the volatility of the
premium.
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Diversifying Speculators
Diversifying speculators are agents with a fixed investment in the asset market, and who use
the commodity future market as and additional channel of speculation and portfolio diversi-
fication. They act competitively with a mass normalized to ND, which is given exogenously.
6
I assume that diversifiers are endowed with a number of long contracts in the asset market,
which can be thought of a bond/stock portfolio. Further, diversifiers are born with a fraction
N of the long asset, such that their initial wealth W0 is given by W0 = NP0. Similar to
the case of the traditional speculators, diversifying speculators contstraints are modeled in
reduced form. Thus they maximize E0(W1)− γD2 V ar0(W1), where W1 = N ·P1 +hD(S1−F ),
with respect to hD, the number of commodity futures contracts. The FOC is
hD =
E(S1 − F )
γDσ2
− W0 · Cov0(P1, S1)
σ2
, (2.9)
where γD is the severity of the D-speculators Value-at-Risk constraint, and Cov0(P1, S1) is
the conditional covariance between period 1 asset and commodity prices based on t = 0
information. The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.9) is the speculative com-
ponent, with a similar interpretation as for the traditional speculators. The second term
constitutes the hedging demand of the diversifiers: when the return to futures covaries nega-
tively with the remaining asset returns, diversifying speculators will increase their exposure
in long commodity futures. In the following, I will maintain the assumption that this is the
case. Note that this requires that σD,P < 0, since Cov0(P1, S1) =
ω
g1+i
σD,P . There are two
important reasons that justify this assumption. The first is through historical observation:
the most significant changes in the futures markets have been the massive increase in in-
dex investment, a passive long only strategy that was popularized through large financial
institutions as a portfolio diversifying strategy (Irwin and Sanders 2011). The second reason
is that long futures are important instruments to hedge against non-diversifiable risks, in
particular expected and unexpected inflation (see e.g. Boons, De Roon, and Szymanowska
2011, and the literature referred to therein). For expositional purposes, it is thus convenient
to assume that σD,P < 0, which has a similar effect on the portfolio choice and does not
change the main results of this paper. Also worth pointing out is that the above assumptions
imply that the hedging component is proportional to the value of the stock market portfolio
NP0 = W0.
6This mimics the increase in CIT positions over the last decade, which, as previously argued, was to a
large extend exogenous to current market conditions.
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Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
The rational expectations equilibrium is given by a set of prices S0, S1, F and expectations,
such that given these, commodity spot market and futures markets clear:
G0 − I = Q0 (2.10)
G1 + I = Q1 (2.11)
hP + hA + hD = 0. (2.12)
(2.13)
Rational expectations imply that E0(A1) = A and σ
2 = ( ω
g1+i
)2σ2D, and Cov0(P1, S1) =
ω
g1+i
σD,P . From equations (2.5) and (2.6), we have that S0 = F , and, by clearing for futures
market:
−i ·NP − g1 ·NP +NP · E(S1 − S0)
γPσ2
+
E(S1 − S0)
γAσ2
+ (2.14)
ND ·
(
E(S1 − S0)
γDσ2
− W0 · Cov0(P1, S1)
σ2
)
= 0.
Equation (2.14) defines an implicit solution to the equilibrium amount of storage, since
the conditional moments are non-linar functions of i. Under the maintained assumption that
σD,P < 0, the following Propositions are shown in the Appendix A via the implicit function
theorem.
Proposition 1 Under normal backwardation, the risk premium E(S1−F ) is decreasing
in the number of diversifying speculators ND.
The intuition behind the proposition is straightforward. If diversifying speculators take
on long positions, the demand for long futures raises with the number of speculators and puts
upward pressure on the equilibrium futures price. This reduces hedging costs for producers,
who increase inventory accordingly. Supply in t = 1 rises and the expected spot price fall.
The result is consistent with empirical evidence provided by Hamilton and Wu (2014) and
Brunetti and Reiffen (2014), which indicates that financial investors had an impact on decline
in the risk premiums in various commodity markets during the recent years.
Proposition 2 In the presence of diversifying speculators, positive (negative) asset mar-
ket shocks have an increasing (decreasing) effect on the commodity spot price.
This effect arises through a change in the risk premium. A positive shock that in-
creases the value of the diversifying speculator’s portfolio also raises his long hedging demand
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through equation (2.9). This reduces the risk premium and increases the equilibrium futures
price. Because hedging future output becomes less costly for producers, a larger fraction of
the commodity is sold in the future. The current spot price increases along with storage.
Proposition 3 The size of the effect of asset market shocks on commodity spot prices is
increasing in the constraints of the traditional speculators.
The intuition behind this result is that ceteris paribus, an increase in the traditional
speculators’ potential to arbitrage reduces the risk premium, i.e. the returns to long futures.
A further reduction of expected returns through the effect described in Proposition 2 has
a more than proportional negative influence on the expected returns and hedging potential
of long futures. In other words, increased portfolio hedging demand by diversifiers cannot
reduce the risk premium by too much if they do not want to forfeit the benefits from hedging.
Since the risk premium is already relatively small, the additional demand from portfolio
hedging is also smaller. Proposition 3 relates nicely to the empirical analysis in the following
chapters, since it has been suggested that the the arbitrage potential was particularly low
after the outbreak of the financial crisis, when many institutions were forced to reorganize
their balance sheets and withdraw positions. A direct implication of the proposition is that
the spillover effects from the stock to commodity markets should have had a stronger effect
during this period.
2.4 The Empirical Effect of Stock Market Movements
on CITs’ Positions
Data Description
The empirical analysis focuses on the role of the CITs, which most closely resembles the
diversifying speculators presented in the theoretical section. The data on positions in com-
modity futures markets can be obtained through the Commitments of Traders (COT) report
of the US Commodity Futures Trading Comission (CFTC).7 The publicly available version
of this report contains the aggregate futures positions of different groups of traders as of
the Tuesday of each week. The CFTC collects this information via questionnaires and
interviews for all traders meeting the reporting levels set by the Commission, where the
non-reportable traders are small producers, hedgers or speculators, whose holdings fall be-
low a determined threshold. The positions of reportable traders typically cover 70 to 90
percent of the total open interest for any particular commodity. An important breakdown
7See http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders.
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of the positions of the various groups of traders has been provided retrospectively until 2006
through the Commodity Index Trader Supplement for 12 agricultural and livestock mar-
kets. In addition to the standard commercial (hedgers) and non-commercial (speculators)
classification of the COT reports, the supplement reports the positions of commodity index
traders (CIT). Index investors use two principal means to engage in index investment activ-
ity: direct investment in futures markets and indirect investment through over-the-counter
(OTC) swap agreements with financial firms. Via personal interview and special question-
naires the CFTC computes daily information of the index activity of index funds, swap
dealers, pension funds, hedge funds and mutual funds investments in exchange traded funds
(ETFs), exchange traded notes (ETNs) and similar exchange-traded products that have a
fiduciary or other obligation to track the value of a commodity or basket of commodities in
an essentially passive manner. The remaining positions are classified as commercials (Pro-
ducers/Merchants/Processors/Users) and non-commercials, without taking into account the
CIT positions that are displayed separately. The Commodity Index Trader Supplement
is the best publicly available data on CIT positions, but not without problems. Particu-
larly non-commercials have incentives to misreport their true positions and activities due to
tighter regulation for this group, and the CFTC classification is not uncontroversial (Stoll
and Whaley 2010).
An overview over the 12 agricultural commodity markets considered in this study is given
in table (2.1). These commodities can be grouped into grains (wheat, corn, soybeans, and
soybean oil), fibers (cotton), livestock (live cattle, feeder cattle and lean hogs) and softs
(cocoa, coffee, sugar). The cross-sectional variation of open interest is considerable, with
an 2006- 2011 average from 1.7 million in the Corn market to an average of 35 thousand
outstanding contracts for Feeder cattle.8 Likewise, the relative importance of CITs differs
across markets. In most of the markets, CIT held an average of about 25% to 30% over the
considered time period. Noticeable exceptions are cocoa (15%), Chicago wheat (42%) and
Lean Hogs (41%). Figure (2.3) describes the evolution of CIT long positions and commodity
prices in the different markets over time. While some CIT positions exhibit a slight upward
trend in some markets, these increases are much less pronounced than in the pre-2006 period.
Most noticeable is the simultaneous decline in CIT positions in the end of 2008 in all markets.
The other variables included in the regression contain the Baltic Dry Cargo Index, the
secondary market T-Bill rate and lagged price changes. The Baltic Dry Cargo Index repli-
cates current shipping freight costs, and is thus an important indicator of global economy
activity and demand (Kilian 2009). The measure of the current interest rate is an impor-
8However, it has to be taken into account that the contract units are not easily comparable across
commodity groups. Part of the literature suggestes to weight the open interest with the dollar value of
contracts, but since I am interested in relative position changes, this is not necessary here.
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tant determinant of asset prices, and also connected to the financing and opportunity costs
of storage. Lagged changes in the price of the commodity are included to account for the
possibility that the CIT’s strategy conditions on them.9 Due to lack of availability, the first
nearby futures price is used to proxy the spot price of the commodity. As the futures price
converges towards the spot price with approaching maturity, and the first contract is often
used to settle nearby physical delivery, the approximation error should be small. All vari-
ables are adjusted to a weekly frequency and match the Tuesday’s CFTC Report. All series
are available from 03/Jan/2006 until 27/Dec/2011, comprising 313 observations over time.
Hypothesis and Empirical Framework
The hypothesis tested in this section provide empirical evidence for the mechanisms reflected
in Proposition 2 as well as Proposition 3 of the theoretical section. Regarding Proposition
2, the key theoretical mechanism suggests that diversifying speculators, i.e. CITs, should
react consistently to positive stock market shocks by increasing their long futures position.
Also, I exploit the fact that during the financial crisis, traditional speculators were more
constraint (Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong 2014) to provide evidence for Proposition 3. The
implied effects on the risk premium and prices are only presented descriptively. One of the
reasons is that when the fundamental correlation between stock and commodity markets
is time-varying, these effects are empirically not identified. This is because stock market
returns have demand effects through changes in wealth, and might also contain signals about
future economic activity (Beaudry and Portier 2004), thereby affecting current demand or
expectations. Speaking in terms of my model, suppose that period t = 0 asset price shocks
have a permanent impact on the stochastic demand parameter A. In this case, the expected
spot price in period 1 rises after a stock market shock, storers have incentives to hedge further
output and diversifiers increase positions alongside. Moreover, this effect would induce an
increased correlation between asset and commodity prices through reduced demand in period
1, which is observationally equivalent to a financial demand induced shock. By focusing
on the reaction of different types of market participants this problem can be somewhat
alleviated, as they help to discriminate between fundamental shocks, that affect asset prices
and commodity demand simultaneously, and financial demand induced shocks. A crucial
difference to discriminate between the the two mechanisms is the reaction of commercial
speculators that are buyers of commodities and thus naturally long. While not considered
explicitly in the model, the fundamental shock should lead to an increased demand of long
futures of the latter, while the financial demand shock would should have a negligible or
9Futures prices for agricultural and livestock commodities are obtained from wikiposit.org. Sample data
from the CME website was used to verify their correctness.
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negative impact on their demand due to an increased cost of futures hedging.10
The baseline model is a fixed effects panel regression of the form:
∆Posj,it = α
j,i +
L∑
k=0
βjr
S&P
t−k + Controls
′γ + i,jt , (2.15)
where ∆Posj,it , is the position change of trader group j in commodity market i, r
S&P
t is the
return to the S&P 500 stock market index, and the controls include the percentage changes
in the Baltic Dry Index and changes in the interest rate as common variables, as well as
a set of market specific variables: lagged percentage changes in the spot price, in order to
account for price induced position changes, lagged position changes of the specific trader
group in order to account for momentum effects and a set of commodity specific month
dummies in order to account for seasonal effects. The estimations are performed for each
trader group j separately. The panel framework suggested by (2.15) is particularly relevant
for the analysis of CITs, since they are typically diversified over a wide range of markets and
the corresponding investment decisions are typically proportional according to fixed rules.
Finally, a fixed effects regression is employed in order to account for market specific time
invariant factors.
Regression results
Table (2.3) displays the results for the baseline specification for CIT position changes, which
includes contemporaneous changes in macroeconomic variables on the right hand side. An
overview over the variables used in the regressions is given in table (2.2). Contemporaneous
market specific changes, in particular the current spot price returns are excluded, since my
model strongly suggests that it is determined endogenously by changes in CIT positions. CIT
positions are divided by a constant measuring the size of the market (average open interest
over the 2006 - 2011 period), in order to account for the fact that the position changes
will potentially be larger in a big market. Thus, the dependent variable, CIT long position
variable is the same as displayed in figure (2.3), varying between 0.2 and 0.5 over markets
and time. The interpretation is somewhat similar to percentage terms, but assuming that
other traders’ positions stay equal. The estimates for the most parsimonious model outlined
previously are presented in column 2 of table (2.3). Effects from contemporaneous and lagged
stock market returns are statistically significant at a 1% significance level (5% for the second
lag). A one unit increase in contemporaneous stock returns rises the relative long positions by
about 0.02 units, and lagged stock returns increase these positions by about 0.012 units. The
second lag of the returns of the Baltic Dry Index also have statistically significant impacts,
10A similar argument is forwarded by Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2014).
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along with percentage the lag 2 % changes of the interest rate, although the coefficient is
substantially smaller. There seems to be some inertia in CIT position changes, with the
lagged change in the CIT position influencing the current change significantly. However, the
overall R2 is very small with just over 0.07.
Column 2 in table (2.4), shows that the results also hold for the forecasting equation.
Here, I leave out all contemporaneous variables in order to avoid a potential bias that might
arise through endogeneity, as outlined in the previous section. The results are very similar
to those of the baseline baseline and the impact is statistically very significant.
Robustness checks and Crisis Period
As robustness checks I include three further variables that might be important for the de-
termination of CIT positions. The first variable is a measure of the exchange rate, which is
an important for internationally traded commodities, and which also has shown increasing,
albeit negative, comovement with commodity prices over the recent years (UNCTAD 2011).
I control also for changes in the oil price, since oil is an important input for agricultural
production and thus might induce supply shocks in these markets (see e.g. Baumeister and
Kilian 2014). Finally, I also include a measure of the changes in the future curve by com-
puting the difference of the spot and the 4th month futures contract. The reason is that
the larger the market is in backwardation, the larger the roll yield for CITs becomes, which
might induce additional speculative activity from this group of traders. The empirical results
for the baseline and the forecasting model are depicted in the first columns of table (2.3)
and (2.4). Of the additional variables, especially changes in the slope of the futures curve
seems to be of importance. While the size of the coefficients for current and lagged stock
prices decreases, they are still statistically significant at all conventional significance levels.
The third column in table (2.4) and (2.3) present the estimates from the post-crises period
only. Again the effect of stock market changes is statistically significant, and the size of the
coefficients increases substantially in comparison with the relevant column 1. This is in line
with the hypothesis that stock market shocks had a particular strong influence in and after
the crises period.
Reaction of Commercials
This section presents the responses of the other trading participants to stock market shocks.
If the effect of stock market shocks on commodity prices would work primarily through the
demand or expectation channel, we would expect merchants - hedgers classified as com-
mercials such as airlines - to react systematically to these shocks as well. The results in
table (2.5) provide no evidence for a systematic reaction of this group. If anything, the
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contemporaneous regression indicate a negative relationship between stock market returns
and positions. This supports my hypothesis that position changes that are attributable to
stock market returns are significant for non-commercials, in particular CITs, but not to other
groups.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper discusses the recent increase in asset and commodity price comovement and
increased participation of financial investors in commodity future markets. I develop a
theoretical model that shows demand for futures by financial investors can transmit stock
market shocks into commodity prices via a time varying risk premium. Based on data
from the Commodity Trading Futures Commission on futures position of different market
participants, I introduce an empirical framework for empirical evaluation of my model. The
results suggest that commodity index investors react systematically to negative stock market
shocks by reducing their commodity risk exposure. This increases the risk premium for
commercial producers, and thereby transmits into commodity prices. This mechanism is
consistent with my theoretical model, and helps to explain the increased comovement of
stock market and commodity prices.
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2.A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 - 3
This sections sketches the proofs for the Propositions in the theoretical section.
Proof of Proposition 1
Plugging in the conditional moments, equation (2.14) can be written as
−iNP (γAγPγD)
(
ω
g1 + i
)2
σ2D − g1NP (γAγPγD)
(
ω
g1 + i
)2
σ2D (2.16)
+
(
ωA¯
g1 + i
− ωA0
g0 − i
)(
γD
ND
γA +
γD
ND
γP
NP
+
γP
NP
γA
)
− γP
NP
γDγAW0
(
ω
g1 + i
)
σD,P = 0 ≡ F (i,Θ),
where Θ is a vector of parameters. The result follows from implicitly differentiating
∂i
∂ND
= −F (∂·)
∂ND
/
∂F (∂·)
∂i
> 0 (2.17)
where the inequality holds if
(
ωA¯
g1+i
− ωA0
g0−i
)
, i.e. the market is in normal backwardation.
Moreover, E(S1) is decreasing in i and F = S0 is increasing in i. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2
I am comparing a situation with diversifying speculators to the situation without them.
In the case no diversifying speculators are present, equtation (2.14) collapses to
− i ·NP − g1 ·NP +NP · E(S1 − S0)
γPσ2
+
E(S1 − S0)
γAσ2
, (2.18)
and asset market shocks have only an indirect effect on the spot market price through the
covariance σD,P . If diversifying speculators are present, equation (2.16) applies. Moreover,
the diversifiers’ wealth W0 = N · P−1 + P,0 is increasing in asset market shocks. Implicitely
differentiating
∂i
∂W0
= −F (∂·)
∂W0
/
∂F (∂·)
∂i
> 0 (2.19)
proofs the result.
Proof of Proposition 3
The direct effect of asset market shocks can be calculated by the chain rule ∂S0/∂P,0 =
∂S0/∂i · ∂i/∂P,0. Differentiating this expression with respect to γS proofs the result.
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2.B Appendix: Figures
Figure 2.1: This figure depicts the one year rolling window return correlations between the
S&P 500 and two major commodity indexes based on daily data. Data source: Datastream
September 2008
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Figure 2.2: This figure depicts the positions of futures traders classified as commercials and
the total open interest (futures and options) for the NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil relative
to total open interest from 2000 to 2006. Commercial positions are computed as the sum of
short, long and spread positions. Data source: CFTC
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Figure 2.3: This figure depicts changes in CIT long futures positions and price changes of the
different commodities. In order to make the different markets comparable, positions (prices)
are normalized by dividing by through the average total open interest (10 times the average
price) over the 2006 - 2011 period. Data source: CFTC
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2.C Appendix: Tables
Table 2.1: Overview over agricultural commodities investigated in the empirical section.
Commodity Category Contract Unit Aver. Price Exchange Aver. OI % CIT
per Unit of OI
Wheat Chicago Grains 5,000 Bushels 620 $ CBOT 502,481 42%
Wheat Kansas Grains 5,000 Bushels 660 $ KBOT 148,552 24%
Corn Grains 5,000 Bushels 440 $ CBOT 1,729,850 25%
Soybeans Grains 5,000 Bushels 1,013 $ CBOT 631,619 27%
Soybean Oil Grains 60,000 Pounds 41 $ CBOT 321,630 26%
Cotton No.2 Fibers 50,000 Pounds 0.77 $ NYBOT/ICE 90,459 30%
Lean Hogs Livestock 40,000 Pounds 70 $ CME 214,830 41%
Live Cattle Livestock 40,000 Pounds 95 $ CME 326,902 37%
Feeder Cattle Livestock 50,000 Pounds 110 $ CME 35,113 25%
Cocoa Softs 10 Metric Tons 2,432 $ NYBOT/ICE 155,229 15%
Sugar Softs 112,000 Pounds 0.17 $ NYBOT/ICE 934,001 28%
Coffee Softs 37,500 Pounds 14,986 $ NYBOT/ICE 178,545 24%
Aver. Price per Unit = Average Price per Unit; Aver. OI= Average Open Interest in Contracts;
CIT Long = Pct. of Open Interest represented by CIT Long Contracts;
Averages computed through 03/01/2006 - 27/12/2011
Table 2.2: Variables used in the regression
Name Underlying variable Transformation
sp500ret S&P 500 returns
CIT long relative CIT Long positions long positions / marketsize (average OI)
D.Com Long relative Commercial Long positions long positions / marketsize (average OI)
BDYret Balt Dry Index returns
fpriceret Spot price returns
tbsecret 3M T-bill returns
usg6wic Exchange rate changes
oilret Oil price returns
relchange Spot and Futures price % change spot - % change futures
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(1) (2) (3)
D.CIT Long relative D.CIT Long relative D.CIT Long relative
sp500ret 0.0162∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗
(3.22) (7.86) (5.58)
L.sp500ret 0.0167∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗
(4.04) (5.79) (6.01)
L2.sp500ret 0.0132∗ 0.0147∗∗ 0.0186∗
(2.88) (3.40) (2.38)
LD.CIT Long relative 0.109∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.0936∗∗
(4.69) (5.04) (3.12)
L2D.CIT Long relative -0.0221 -0.0218 -0.0580
(-0.75) (-0.76) (-1.21)
BDYret 0.000980 0.00202 0.000938
(0.46) (0.98) (0.44)
L.BDYret 0.000314 0.000550 0.00205
(0.23) (0.45) (1.33)
L2.BDYret 0.00540∗∗ 0.00658∗∗∗ 0.00704∗∗∗
(4.34) (5.11) (6.13)
L.fpriceret -0.00293 0.00251 -0.00184
(-0.78) (0.76) (-0.37)
L2.fpriceret 0.000770 0.00223 0.00494
(0.29) (0.88) (1.31)
tbsecret -0.000604 -0.000345 -0.000510
(-1.65) (-1.31) (-1.20)
L.tbsecret 0.000202 0.000228 0.000205
(0.40) (0.54) (0.38)
L2.tbsecret -0.00210∗ -0.00210∗ -0.00184∗
(-2.87) (-2.83) (-2.63)
D.usg6wic -0.000329∗∗∗ 0.000101
(-5.26) (0.75)
LD.usg6wic -0.000327∗ -0.000230
(-2.33) (-1.56)
L2D.usg6wic -0.0000136 0.0000320
(-0.10) (0.22)
oilret 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.00964∗∗
(7.04) (4.29)
L.oilret 0.00509 0.000434
(1.56) (0.10)
L2.oilret 0.00278 0.00133
(1.43) (0.38)
L.relchange22 -0.0166∗∗ -0.0180∗
(-4.20) (-2.87)
L2.relchange22 0.00196 0.00627
(0.56) (1.14)
time fixed effects yes yes yes
market specific
seasonal dummies yes yes yes
constant yes yes yes
N 3720 3720 2088
R2 0.087 0.073 0.107
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.3: Baseline estimation including contemporaneous variables. The dependent variable
is (relative) CIT position changes. Variables are described in table (2.2). T-statistics based
on clustered standard errors reported.
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(1) (2) (3)
D.CIT Long relative D.CIT Long relative D.CIT Long relative
L.sp500ret 0.0151∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗
(3.29) (4.57) (6.11)
L2.sp500ret 0.0145∗∗ 0.0136∗∗ 0.0149
(3.16) (3.14) (1.84)
LD.CIT Long relative 0.118∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(4.95) (5.21) (3.37)
L2D.CIT Long relative -0.0166 -0.0166 -0.0472
(-0.56) (-0.58) (-0.98)
L.BDYret 0.000801 0.00155 0.00249
(0.66) (1.37) (1.77)
L2.BDYret 0.00709∗∗∗ 0.00689∗∗∗ 0.00849∗∗∗
(6.14) (6.16) (7.82)
L.fpriceret -0.00302 0.00270 -0.00203
(-0.83) (0.85) (-0.44)
L2.fpriceret 0.00247 0.00163 0.00719
(0.91) (0.60) (1.84)
L.tbsecret 0.000323 0.000384 0.000551
(0.72) (0.97) (1.12)
L2.tbsecret -0.00217∗ -0.00223∗ -0.00193∗
(-2.98) (-2.99) (-2.72)
LD.usg6wic -0.000292 -0.000238
(-2.15) (-1.72)
L2D.usg6wic 0.0000764 0.0000927
(0.58) (0.67)
L.oilret 0.00441 -0.000410
(1.48) (-0.10)
L2.oilret 0.000540 -0.00137
(0.29) (-0.39)
L.relchange22 -0.0173∗∗ -0.0183∗
(-4.17) (-2.83)
L2.relchange22 0.00322 0.00815
(0.83) (1.26)
time fixed effects yes yes yes
market specific
seasonal dummies yes yes yes
constant yes yes yes
N 3720 3720 2088
R2 0.064 0.061 0.081
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.4: Baseline forecasting regression. The dependent variable is (relative) CIT position
changes. Variables are described in table (2.2). T-statistics based on clustered standard
errors reported.
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(1) (2)
D.Com Long relative D.Com Long relative
sp500ret -0.0517*
(0.020)
L.sp500ret, -0.0026 0.0008
(0.010) (0.009)
L2.sp500ret, 0.0137
(0.009)
L.Com Long relative, 0.1754*** 0.1743***
(0.026) (0.026)
L2.Com Long relative, -0.0502* -0.0513*
(0.021) (0.021)
L.BDYret, 0.0011 0.0001
(0.003) (0.003)
L2.BDYret, 0.0057 0.0056
(0.003) (0.003)
L.fpriceret, 0.0086 0.0077
(0.010) (0.010)
L2.fpriceret, 0.0033 0.0020
(0.011) (0.010)
L.tbsecret, -0.0012 -0.0013
(0.001) (0.001)
L2.tbsecret, 0.0009 0.0012
(0.001) (0.001)
L.relchange22, -0.0031 -0.0039
(0.016) (0.016)
L2.relchange22, 0.0021 0.0007
(0.020) (0.019)
time fixed effects yes yes
market specific
seasonal dummies yes yes
Constant yes yes
Observations 3,720 3,720
R-squared 0.04 0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.02, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Regressions for commercial long positions. Column (1) contains the contempora-
neous, column (2) the forecasting regression. The dependent variable is (relative) Commer-
cial Long position changes. Variables are described in table (2.2). Clustered standard errors
reported.
60
References
Acharya, Viral V, Lars A Lochstoer, and Tarun Ramadorai (2013). “Limits to arbitrage and
hedging: Evidence from commodity markets.” Journal of Financial Economics 109.2,
pp. 441–465.
Ambroseno, L. and J. Simpson (2008). “Commodities as a Strategic Component of an In-
vestment Portfolio.” Issues of Interest - Morgan Stanley Investment Management report.
Baumeister, Christiane and Lutz Kilian (2014). “Do oil price increases cause higher food
prices?” Economic Policy 29.80, pp. 691–747.
Beaudry, Paul and Franck Portier (2004). “Stock prices, news and economic fluctuations.”
Bessembinder, H. (1992). “Systematic risk, hedging pressure, and risk premiums in futures
markets.” Review of Financial Studies 5.4, pp. 637–667.
Boons, M., F. De Roon, and M. Szymanowska (2011). “The stock market price of commodity
risk.” Working Paper.
Brunetti, Celso and David Reiffen (2014). “Commodity index trading and hedging costs.”
Journal of Financial Markets 21, pp. 153–180.
Buyuksahin, B. and M. Robe (2011). “Does ”paper oil” matter? Energy markets’ financial-
ization and equity-commodity co-movements.” Working paper.
Bu¨yu¨ks¸ahin, Bahattin and Michel A Robe (2014). “Speculators, commodities and cross-
market linkages.” Journal of International Money and Finance 42, pp. 38–70.
Carter, C.A., G.C. Rausser, and A. Schmitz (1983). “Efficient asset portfolios and the theory
of normal backwardation.” The Journal of Political Economy 91.2, pp. 319–331.
Chang, E.C. (1985). “Returns to speculators and the theory of normal backwardation.”
Journal of Finance, pp. 193–208.
Cheng, Haw, Andrei Kirilenko, and Wei Xiong (2014). “Convective risk flows in commodity
futures markets.” Review of Finance.
Danielsson, J., H. Shin, and J.P. Zigrand (2009). “Risk appetite and endogenous risk.”
London School of Economics, working paper.
Danthine, J.P. (1978). “Information, Futures Prices, and Stabilizing Speculation.” Journal
of Economic Theory 17, pp. 79–98.
De Long, J.B. et al. (1990). “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets.” The Journal of
Political Economy 98.4, pp. 703–738.
Etula, Erkko (2013). “Broker-dealer risk appetite and commodity returns.” Journal of Fi-
nancial Econometrics, nbs024.
Fattouh, Bassam, Lutz Kilian, and Lavan Mahadeva (2013). “The Role of Speculation in Oil
Markets: What Have We Learned So Far?” The Energy Journal 34.3.
61
Forbes, K.J. and R. Rigobon (2002). “No contagion, only interdependence: measuring stock
market comovements.” The Journal of Finance 57.5, pp. 2223–2261.
Gao, L. and S. Suess (2011). “Market Sentiment in Commodity Futures Returns.” Working
paper.
Gorton, G.B. and K.G. Rouwenhorst (2004). “Facts and fantasies about commodity futures.”
NBER Working Paper.
Greer, R.J. (2000). “The nature of commodity index returns.” The Journal of Alternative
Investments 3.1, pp. 45–52.
Gromb, D. and D. Vayanos (2010). Limits of arbitrage: The state of the theory. Tech. rep.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hamilton, James D and Jing Cynthia Wu (2014). “Risk premia in crude oil futures prices.”
Journal of International Money and Finance 42, pp. 9–37.
Hamilton, James D and Jing Cynthia Wu (2015). “Effects of Index-Fund Investing on Com-
modity Futures Prices.” International Economic Review 56.1, pp. 187–205.
Hamilton, J.D. (2009). “Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–08.” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1, pp. 215–261.
Hirshleifer, D. (1990). “Hedging pressure and futures price movements in a general equilib-
rium model.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp. 411–428.
Hong, Harrison and Motohiro Yogo (2012). “What does futures market interest tell us about
the macroeconomy and asset prices?” Journal of Financial Economics 105.3, pp. 473–
490.
Irwin, S.H. and D.R. Sanders (2011). “Index funds, financialization, and commodity futures
markets.” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 33.1, pp. 1–31.
Irwin, S.H., D.R. Sanders, and R.P. Merrin (2009). “Devil or angel? The role of speculation
in the recent commodity price boom (and bust).” Journal of Agricultural and Applied
Economics 41.2, pp. 377–91.
Kawai, M. (1983). “Price volatility of storable commodities under rational expectations in
spot and futures markets.” International Economic Review 24.2, pp. 435–459.
Keynes, J.M. (1976). A treatise on money. New York; AMS Press.
Kilian, Lutz (2009). “Not all oil price shocks are alike: Disentangling demand and supply
shocks in the crude oil market.” The American Economic Review, pp. 1053–1069.
Liu, P., Z. Qiu, and K. Tang (2011). “Financial-Demand Based Commodity Pricing.” Work-
ing paper.
Lombardi, Marco Jacopo and Francesco Ravazzolo (2013). “On the correlation between com-
modity and equity returns: implications for portfolio allocation.”
Lombardi, M.J. and I. Van Robays (2011). “Do Financial Investors destabilize the oil price?”
ECB Working Paper.
62
Masters, M.W. (2008). “Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs.” US Senate, Washington, May 20.
Maystre, Nicolas and David Bicchetti (2012). “The synchronized and long-lasting structural
change on commodity markets: evidence from high frequency data.” Algorithmic Finance
(2013) 2, pp. 3–4.
Parsons, J.E. (2010). “Black gold and fool’s gold: speculation in the oil futures market.”
Economı´a 10.2, pp. 81–116.
Sanders, D.R. and S.H. Irwin (2011a). “New evidence on the impact of index funds in US
grain futures markets.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne
d’agroeconomie.
Sanders, D.R. and S.H. Irwin (2011b). “The impact of index funds in commodity futures
markets: A systems approach.” The Journal of Alternative Investments 14.1, pp. 40–49.
Shleifer, A. (1986). “Do demand curves for stocks slope down?” Journal of Finance, pp. 579–
590.
Singleton, Kenneth J (2013). “Investor flows and the 2008 boom/bust in oil prices.” Man-
agement Science 60.2, pp. 300–318.
Stoll, H.R. and R.E. Whaley (2010). “Commodity index investing and commodity futures
prices.” Journal of Applied Finance 20.1, pp. 7–46.
Tang, K. and W. Xiong (2010). Index investment and financialization of commodities. Tech.
rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
UNCTAD (2011). “Price Formation in Financialized Commodity Markets: The Role of In-
formation.” United Nations Report.
Vansteenkiste, Isabel (2011). “What is driving oil futures prices? Fundamentals versus spec-
ulation.” ECB Working Paper.
63
Chapter 3
Regional Decentralization and Fiscal
Policy Effects - International and
Intranational Evidence
Joint with Abia´n Garc´ıa Rodr´ıguez
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between the government structure and the effective-
ness of fiscal policy. The effects of fiscal policy on economic outcomes is of high importance
for policy makers and academics alike; also, it is a striking feature that countries vary sub-
stantially in their organization of taxing and spending competences between different levels
of government. We refer to the latter as the degree of “regionalization” and provide ev-
idence that more decentralized countries, in other words, countries in which the regional
governments have more fiscal competences, are associated with more effective fiscal policies.
The organization of taxing and spending competences between different levels of gov-
ernment has been shown to be important for government deficit reduction (Schaltegger and
Feld 2009), the size of the government (Feld, Kirchga¨ssner, and Schaltegger 2004), economic
growth (Thießen 2003) and fiscal discipline (Rodden 2002). At the same time, the academic
literature on the determinants and transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy is still incon-
clusive (see e.g. Perotti 2007; Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller 2012). While determinants of
fiscal policy effectiveness such as the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness
to trade and public indebtedness have been addressed in the literature before (see e.g. Ilzet-
zki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh 2013) this is to our best knowledge the first study to investigate the
relationship between decentralization and fiscal policy effectiveness in terms of multipliers.
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Using two distinct empirical approaches we show that fiscal decentralization is associ-
ated positively with the effectiveness of fiscal policy for stimulating economic growth. The
first approach exploits cross country variation in the degree of relative spending competences
between central and regional governments. In none of the various European countries consid-
ered in our study, government spending is completely carried out by the central government,
and, in some countries, regional governments are responsible for more than half of the total
government spending. In a first step, we construct a “decentralization index” based on the
relative spending of the regional governments and classify countries accordingly. We then
estimate the response of GDP to unexpected government spending using the SVAR approach
suggested by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for each country separately. The results indicate
that a higher degree of decentralization in terms of government spending and taxation is,
on average, associated with a larger impact of government spending and revenue shocks on
economic growth. In particular, the corresponding fiscal multipliers tend to be larger in
countries that are more decentralized. While the empirical approach is similar to studies
including cross country evidence such as Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2012) or Ilzetzki, Men-
doza, and Ve´gh (2013), we acknowledge two potential shortcomings of our approach. First,
the countries and their regions used in our study vary importantly in size of the regional
and central governments, which makes the comparison of the different type of governments
across countries difficult. Second, our the SVAR approach is based on total government
spending, i.e. the sum of central and regional government spending; thus it does not identify
if in any point of time, the government spending shocks resulted from the regional or central
government.
We address these shortcomings by contrasting our results with a case study from Spain,
which is one of the few countries in our sample displaying important time variation in the
degree of decentralization. Spain offers a unique example of fiscal decentralization due to
historical reasons. The dictatorship that ruled the country for almost forty years until 1975
imposed a very centralized fiscal system on a country with very heterogeneous regions. An
important pillar of the Spanish transition to democracy involved transferring fiscal autonomy
to the regions. We exploit the time variation as well as the fact that this decentralization
process was not implemented in all regions at the same time. We argue that the timing of the
implementations is a reaction to political rather than economic forces, therefore yielding an
identification for the effects of decentralization on economic growth. The exact timing and
sizes of these shocks are pinpointed via the “narrative approach” to fiscal policy evaluation
(Romer and Romer 2010). We use data on fiscal spending and revenues at the regional level,
which also allows for a more thorough decomposition of fiscal policy instruments into three
series: direct taxation income, indirect taxation income and spending.Our results provide
evidence for significant positive effects of decentralization on regional GDP growth with the
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size of the effect being particularly large for the direct taxation series. Contrary to the
cases of the decentralization of spending or indirect taxation, the regional governments were
allowed to modify important legislative aspects concerning direct taxation in the latter case.
Hence the increased decision power of the regions to employ fiscal instruments in general,
and direct taxation in particular, leads to the positive impact of fiscal decentralization on
regional output growth documented in this paper.
Our results are consistent with standard theories of fiscal federalism (Oates et al. 1972;
Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini 2001) postulating that local governments have an infor-
mational advantage when implementing fiscal policy. While central governments will tend to
make rather homogeneous allocations, regional fiscal policy can be tailored and will therefore
be more effective if there is a large degree of heterogeneity in preferences and / or economic
conditions within a single country. The case study also shows that when it comes to fiscal
decentralization, the “how” is important relative to the “how much”: decentralization of di-
rect taxation, which can be designed and implemented relatively freely by the regions, seems
to be more effective than the decentralization of other fiscal instruments such as indirect
taxation and spending.
The remainder of this paper is structured as followed: section 2 presents the cross country
evidence starting with a discussion of the decentralization measure followed by the empir-
ical implimentations and results; section 3 presents evidence from Spain, while section 4
concludes.
3.2 International Evidence
3.2.1 Measuring Decentralization
This section investigates the cross-country relationship between decentralization and fiscal
policy effectiveness in the form of government spending and revenue multiplier. Measures
of decentralization typically fall in one of the two categories: the first focuses on fiscal
policy, and the relation between expenditures and allocations, while the second focuses on
the nature of the intergovernmental relations and their regulation (see e.g the survey Sharma
2006). We draw on the former, since it provides a clearer quantitative measure and the focus
of this study is fiscal policy. Indeed, Sharma (2006) concludes that when it comes to the
measurement of fiscal decentralization, the share of sub-national expenditures and revenues
is considered to be the best indicator. Following this idea, the measure of decentralization
we consider in the subsequent analysis is subnational (regional) spending as a percentage
of total public spending of a respective country. Since we are interested in the effect of
direct government spending, we exclude transfers (“social protection”) from both the regional
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and the total government spending. However, as shown below, alternative decentralization
measures based on total spending (i.e. including transfers) and relative tax rather than
spending competences lead to a similar classification of “centralized” and “decentralized”
countries.
One caveat of our approach to measuring decentralization is that it does not account
for potentially delegated spending, i.e. regional spending that was not carried out in an
autonomous manner but rather part of a central government’s mandate. However, similar
decentralization measures are common in the literature and a good proxy for decentralization
(Davoodi and Zou 1998; Oates 1985; De Mello 2001). Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) suggest that
the measure should perform reasonably well for the developed countries used in this study.
We use yearly data from 1996 to 2011 on regional central government spending. Our
decentralization index, presented in figure (3.1), is then computed as the average regional
government spending net of transfers over the total government spending net of transfers:1
Di =
1
T
T∑
t
government spending by non-central governmentit
total government spendingit
, (3.1)
where Di is the value of the index for country i.
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Figure 3.1: Decentralization Index: Regional share of spending net of transfers. Averages
along with highest and lowest observation. Calculation based on yearly data 1996 - 2011.
The average of the decentralization measure for the period considered about 45 %, im-
plying that on average, less than half of total non-transfer spending is carried out at the
1The particular selection of the countries is based on data availability (excluding for example Eastern
European countries) and variation in decentralization. Countries such as Belgium and Netherlands, for
example, have a decentralization index very close to the median and where hence excluded.
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sub-national level. However, there is a high degree of variability between the extremes of
the index, with values as low as 8 % for Greece and as high as 82 % for Switzerland. In
the medium of the spectrum, between 45 % and 60%, there is a group of five countries from
Germany to Italy that are very close in terms of the index.
As shown in figure (3.13) in Appendix A, the measure of decentralization is very simi-
lar to the one that is computed including social spending. Similarly reassuring is that the
decentralization index based on taxes, (figure 3.14 in Appendix A), suggests an almost iden-
tical grouping of the countries. The main difference is that Denmark appears to be the
most decentralized country. Based on these observations, we group countries into decentral-
ized countries (Group 1: Switzerland, Spain and Denmark), centralized countries (Group 3:
UK, Greece, Portugal and France), and a range of medium centralized countries (Group 2:
Sweden, Germany, Italy and Austria) for our later analysis.
A potential caveat is that there might be important time variation in our index that is
“averaged away” through our computation of the index. In fact, due to data availability
the data we use for the index construction starts in 1996, while the VAR analysis is based
on data starting from 1980. However, empirically we find the index to be relatively stable
over time. The graphs (3.1) and (3.13) and (3.14) in Appendix A also depict the maximum
and the minimum observation for each country (indicated by the end of the whiskers). The
range appears relatively small, except in the case of Spain. It is exactly this time variation
that we exploit for the second part of this study.
Decentralization and Other Determinants of Fiscal Multipliers
The structure of government is not the only source of variability in the effect of government
spending shocks. In order to identify effects that might arise through the degree of decen-
tralization, we would like the index not to covary systematically with other determinants of
government spending and taxation effectiveness. Indeed, the extensive literature on fiscal
multipliers has identified several factors that can determine the size of fiscal multipliers. For
example, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh (2013) show that for a large set of countries, openness
to trade, exchange rate flexibility and outstanding government debt influence the size of
multipliers. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) findings suggest that for a given country,
multipliers depend on the current state of the economy. In particular, multipliers appear to
be significantly larger in recessions than in expansions. Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2012)
find fiscal multipliers to be larger during financial crisis and fixed exchange rate regimes. Al-
though the evidence concerning the determinants of fiscal multipliers is far from conclusive,
we discuss below how the specific countries and groups might be affected differently by the
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various factors.2
Spending Cons. Spending Inv. Spending Revenues
Group 1 0.211 0.175 0.0361 0.410
(0.0595) (0.0571) (0.00722) (0.0975)
Group 2 0.262 0.233 0.0292 0.479
(0.0645) (0.0557) (0.00994) (0.0742)
Group 3 0.246 0.213 0.0339 0.389
(0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0116) (0.0817)
Table 3.1: Spending and Revenues over GDP by decentralization group. Spending denotes
the sum of government consumption and investment expenditure; Cons. and Inv. Spend-
ing stand for consumption and investment spending, respectively. Standard deviations in
parenthesis. Quarterly observations, 1980 - 2007.
Table (3.1) displays the average government spending, its disaggregated consumption and
investment components and revenues, divided by GDP, for the various groups.3 Government
spending, in particular consumption, appears to be somewhat smaller in decentralized coun-
tries (Group 1), but as seen in figure figure (3.15) in Appendix A, this relationship is rather
weak. Contrary, the average share of revenues tend to be larger in medium decentralized
countries (Group 2).4 Also, there does not seem to be a systematic relationship between
decentralization and the level of government debt. The average government debt per GDP
is around 50% for both centralized and decentralized countries, but larger for the medium
group (table 3.2). As seen in figure (3.16) in Appendix A, this is mainly driven by the
high debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy. Moreover, the numbers presented in table (3.2) document
that the decentralized and centralized groups of countries appear to be quite similar along
the crucial dimensions of GDP growth (capturing boom vs. recessions) and debt to GDP
ratio and the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP as a measure of openness.5 Only
the medium group displays a considerably higher average debt to GDP ratio, and also the
highest openness indicator as measured by import plus exports to GDP.6
2In contrast to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), for example, Ramey and Zubairy (2014) do not
find evidence for elevated fiscal multipliers during economic slacks and the recent financial crisis.
3Table (3.6) in Appendix A provides a more detailed overview over these variables by country.
4Note that table displays gross revenues (including transfers), which means that spending and revenues
do not necessarily have to be equal to imply a balanced budget.
5Table (3.7) in Appendix A provides a more detailed overview over these variables by country.
6To the extent that decentralization is associated with factors such as fiscal discipline, as argued by
Rodden (2002), for example, the effect from decentralization to fiscal multipliers might be indirect but can
still be traced back to the former.
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GDP growth (pc) (X+IM)/GDP Population Gross debt/GDP (pct.)
Group 1 1.847 2.228 17.33 48.59
(1.788) (0.532) (16.10) (13.93)
Group 2 1.853 2.342 38.39 71.05
(1.430) (0.614) (31.38) (21.26)
Group 3 2.082 1.843 34.01 53.91
(2.031) (0.379) (23.86) (21.00)
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for additional determinants of fiscal multipliers by decentral-
ization group, yearly observations 1980 - 2007. Population is in million. Standard deviation
in parenthesis. Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database
and eLibrary.
Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2012) provide definitions for fixed exchange rates regimes
and financial crisis episodes for most countries in our sample.7 Table (3.3) shows that
most countries, with the exception of UK, had a pegged exchange rate for most of the
sample period. Financial crisis, however, seemed to be more frequent in the decentralized
countries. Taken together though, we find only little evidence for major overlaps between
decentralization and other determinants of fiscal multipliers that might be driving our results.
Country Group Currency Peg Financial Crisis
Denmark decentralized 1980 - 2007 1987 - 1992
Spain decentralized 1984 - 2007 1984-1985
Austria medium 1980 - 2007 -
Italy medium 1983 - 1991, 1998 - 2007 1990-91
Sweden medium 1980 -92 1991-94
France centralized 1982 - 2007 1994 - 1995
Portugal centralized 1990 - 2007 -
UK centralized - -
Table 3.3: Overview of exchange rate characteristics and financial crisis periods according
to Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2012) for available countries.
3.2.2 Econometric Framework and Data Description
Our cross-country analysis considers unexpected changes in government spending and rev-
enue in order to evaluate the impact of fiscal policy on output growth. Following Fata´s,
Mihov, et al. (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) we employ Structural VARs (SVAR)
to quantify this impact. Their approaches have in common that they exploit decision lags
in fiscal policy-making which allow to identify fiscal shocks. Since we are using quarterly
7Not covered are Greece, Germany and Switzerland.
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data in our study, the assumption that discretionary government purchases and revenues
are not going to be made effective law and implemented within the same observation period
as a GDP shock is likely to be met; hence they can be predetermined with respect to the
macroeconomic variables.
Proceeding with the description of the reduced form model, for our baseline specification,
we consider the following vector
Xt = (gt, yt, rt)
′, (3.2)
where gt is the growth rate of real government consumption and investment spending, yt is
the growth rate of real GDP and rt is real government revenue growth.
8
The following reduced form model is then estimated individually for each country:
Xt = c0 +
k∑
i=1
φXt−i + et, (3.3)
where c0 is a constant and et ∼ WN(0,Σ) represent the reduced form error shocks. In
order to ensure comparability between the countries, we choose a lag length of k = 5 in each
estimation. This appears to be a reasonable compromise between the four lags proposed by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and the 6 lags employed by Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
The data for government investment and consumption spending, revenues and GDP for
11 European countries are obtained from Oxford Economics. The spending and the GDP
variables are already obtained in real terms, while we transform nominal revenues using the
GDP deflator.9 Growth rates are computed via log changes. For all countries, we use data
from 1985 - 2007, yielding T = 85 observations. Using pre-2008 data ensures that our results
are not affected by the financial crisis.
3.2.3 Identification of Structural Innovations
We assume that the reduced form errors are related to their structural counterparts via the
representation Aet = But, where ut ∼ (0, I) are the structural shocks. Without restrictions
on the parameters in A and B the structural model is not identified. Hence additional
assumptions will be necessary to disentangle A and B from the estimates of the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form errors. Our model is similar to the one of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005), who applied this approach to estimate the effect
of government spending and tax shocks for the US and several other OECD countries. In
particular, let the structural relationship between the reduced form and the structural errors
8Ideally, the government revenue should be net of transfers. However, we take the gross series as a proxy
as we did not find consistent data regarding net transfers for all countries.
9The series not already seasonally adjusted were adjusted using the Census X-13 methodology.
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take the form  1 0 0α21 1 α23
0 α32 1

 e
g
t
eyt
ett
 =
 σ
2
g 0 β13
0 σ2y 0
β31 0 σ
2
t

 u
g
t
uyt
utt
 , (3.4)
where α21, α23 and α32 are, respectively, the value of the elasticities of output relative to
government spending and taxes, and the elasticity of taxes relative to output. The param-
eter β13 captures the response of government spending to unexpected (structural) shocks in
revenue, while conversely, β31 presents the response of government revenues to unexpected
(structural) shocks in spending. Since the reduced form variance-covariance matrix has six
distinct elements, additional assumptions are necessary to identify the parameters α21, α23,
α32, β13 and β31. They are derived from both exclusion restrictions and outside informa-
tion. On a quarterly frequency, fiscal policy is plausibly subject to decision lags, i.e. the
time needed for fiscal policy makers to respond to changes in output is at least one quar-
ter. Then any remaining correlation between the unpredicted components of government
spending and output is due to the impact of government spending on output. Similarly, α32,
the output elasticity of taxes can then be obtained by regressing revenue on the tax base;
and the corresponding estimate can be imposed directly in equation (3.4). One caveat is
that the tax multipliers obtained this way are quite sensitive to the particular estimate of
α32 (Caldara and Kamps 2012). However, for the countries considered in this study, the
values appear quite similar and close to 1 according to recent OECD estimates (Price, Dang,
and Guillemette 2014). This is considerably lower than the estimate of 1.85 obtained by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the United States, but close to the one of 0.95 obtained by
Tenhofen, Wolff, and Heppke-Falk (2010) for Germany. Moreover, since the main purpose of
this study is to derive relative values of fiscal multipliers across countries, and the elasticities
appear indeed similar for these countries, we expect the uncertainty regarding the output
elasticity of taxes not to weight into our results significantly.10 Finally, we follow Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) in setting β13 = 0, which implies that spending decisions come before tax
decisions.
One caveat of our specification is that given that gt presents aggregate government spend-
ing, we have insufficient information if, in each given point in time, spending came from local
or central government.11 Our VAR results therefore identify the average effect of government
spending on growth, without discriminating between the regional and central government
10In fact, we performed robustness analysis using different values for α32, which changed the size of the
multipliers somewhat, but not the relative ordering.
11This of course would allow us to evaluate the relative effect of central and regional government shocks,
respectively more directly. Unfortunately historical time series for quarterly series of regional expenditure is
not available for most countries.
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spending more directly.
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative Spending Multipliers, average across country group. Point estimates
with 84% and 16% bootstrap percentiles.
3.2.4 Results
This section describes the estimation results of the model presented in the previous sec-
tion. We present the results in the following form. First, each countries’ output cumulative
response to a fiscal shock is standardized by dividing the cumulative GDP response to fis-
cal shocks by the ratio of GDP relative to the respective fiscal variable and the standard
deviation of the fiscal shocks:
Dynamic Multiplier =
Output response
Initial Fiscal Shock
∗ (Average fiscal variable share of GDP).
Second, we present average results for the three groups of countries. Averages are taken
over the country specific multipliers in the respective group at each point of time. This
approach is similar to the one employed by Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh (2013), who classify
countries according to a certain characteristic and then estimate fiscal multipliers separately
for each group using panel VARs. Instead, our averaging method does not restrict the
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dynamics for each country in the group to be the same. We employ a bootstrap procedure,
which is outlined in Appendix A in more detail, in order to compute the corresponding
confidence intervals.
The Effect of Government Spending Shocks
Figure (3.2) depicts the multipliers for total government spending. The multiplier for the
most decentralized countries is about one on impact, and slightly increasing to a value of
around two after ten quarters. The multiplier for the centralized countries is noticeably
lower and around 0.5 on impact, and reaches its maximum of one after about one year
before declining afterward. In contrast, the multiplier for the medium countries is only
slightly positive on impact but indistinguishable from zero thereafter. One explanation for
this results is that the group of medium countries also exhibits the highest average debt
to GDP and openness measure, displayed in table (3.2), both of which are associated with
lower multipliers (Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh 2013).
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Government Consumption Multipliers, average across country group.
Point estimates with 84% and 16% bootstrap percentiles.
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Disaggregated Government Spending
This section considers the effect of government consumption and government investment
spending separately. Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002) note that fiscal multipliers can
vary across different policy instruments, so we expect to obtain additional insights from a
disaggregation of the different components of government spending. The estimation follows
the baseline model described above, where gt contains either consumption or investment
spending. Figure (3.3) depicts the multipliers for government consumption spending only,
with a pattern strikingly similar to the aggregate spending multiplier. The only differences
appear to be a dip in the multiplier for the centralized countries after 3 quarters, and a
slightly larger long-run response of output growth for the medium countries.
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative Government Investment Multipliers, average across country group.
Point estimates with 84% and 16% bootstrap percentiles.
In contrast, the results for the government investment spending only, presented in figure
(3.4), indicate much larger multipliers around two for both the centralized and decentral-
ized countries. Here we notice little difference according to decentralization. Moreover, the
multiplier for the medium group turns negative after several quarters. Obtaining negative es-
timates of the multipliers is not uncommon (Perotti 2005), and can occur when distortionary
taxes are imposed following debt financed spending (Baxter and King 1993).
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative Revenue Multipliers, average across country group. The multipliers
describe the output response to a negative tax shock. Point estimates with 84% and 16%
bootstrap percentiles.
The Effect of Government Revenue Shocks
Figure (3.5) displays the estimated revenue multipliers, which appear to be of a smaller
magnitude. On impact all multipliers are similar and around 0.5, but while the multipliers
for the decentralized and medium countries increase over time to a value around 1, the
multiplier for the centralized countries slowly declines.
Taken together, for all cases considered, the decentralized countries exhibit relatively large
multipliers. Only in the case of government investment spending, the group of centralized
countries exhibits multipliers of a similar magnitude as for the decentralized countries: for
government consumption spending and revenues, they are substantially lower and appear to
be less persistent.
3.2.5 Robustness
This section discusses two robustness checks for the results presented in the previous subsec-
tion. The first is based on estimations of bivariate VARs that identify government spending
and government revenue shocks separately; the second contrasts our results from those re-
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ported in Dellas, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005), who provide point estimates for multipliers for
the majority of the countries in our sample.
Estimates based on Bivariate VARs
A further robustness check involves contrasting our results from a series of bivariate VARs
that identify government spending and government revenue shocks separately. An advantage
of using bivariate models is the calculation of the cumulative multipliers from the VAR system
described below are not sensitive to the persistence of the fiscal shocks, whereas for larger
system, this is generally not the case (Giordano et al. 2007). We consider the vectors X1t , X
2
t ,
referring to the models with government spending and with government revue, respectively,
X1t = (gt, yt)
′, X2t = (yt, rt)
′, (3.5)
and estimate the reduced form models with the same specification as the baseline case.
Similar to the baseline model, the identifying assumptions are(
1 0
α21 1
)(
egt
eyt
)
=
(
σ2g 0
0 σ2y
)(
ugt
uyt
)
, (3.6)
in the case of the model including government spending and(
1 α12
α21 1
)(
eyt
ett
)
=
(
σ2y 0
0 σ2t
)(
uyt
utt
)
, (3.7)
in the case of the model including revenues, where α21 is imposed by the output elasticity of
revenues. As for the three variable VARs, we choose −α21 = 1 for all countries.
Figures (3.18), (3.17), (3.19) and (3.20) depicts the multipliers for total government
spending, government revenues, and the disaggregated consumption and investment multi-
pliers respectively, showing almost identical patterns as for the VARs with three variables.
Comparison with Results from Other Cross-country Studies
Our results regarding spending multipliers are supported by the estimates presented in Del-
las, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005), who investigate the effect economic openness has on the size
of fiscal multipliers. The authors’ estimates of government consumption multipliers rely on
a similar yet substantially larger SVAR system, that includes inflation and interest rates,
among others.
Figure (3.6) plots, for the countries available, the decentralization index against the es-
timates obtained by Dellas, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005). Supportive of our findings, there is
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a small, positive relationship between decentralization and government consumption multi-
pliers on impact, that becomes substantial after 4 quarters.
ES
IT
FR
CH
ES
DK
IT
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
Cu
m
m
u
la
tiv
e
 
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t 
c
o
n
s
u
m
pt
io
n
 
sp
e
n
di
n
g 
m
u
lti
pl
ie
r
CH
SEDKUK
GR
SE
UK
FR
GR
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0 20 40 60 80 100
Cu
m
m
u
la
tiv
e
 
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t 
c
o
n
s
u
m
pt
io
n
 
sp
e
n
di
n
g 
m
u
lti
pl
ie
r
Decentralization index
After 1Q
After 4Q
Figure 3.6: Decentralization Index vs. cumulative government consumption spending mul-
tipliers reported in Dellas, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005).
3.3 Intranational Evidence from Spain
3.3.1 The Decentralization Process in Spain (1975-2007)
As apparent from the previous section, the regional decentralization of a country can have a
noticeable impact on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Allowing the regional governments to
carry out a larger share of the total public spending or collect a bigger proportion of taxes
appears to affect how the economy in general - and economic growth, in particular - react with
respect to shocks to the fiscal instruments. In this section, we address some weaknesses of the
cross-country approach, namely the inability to differentiate between central and regional
government spending in each point of time, and a potential difficulty to compare international
regions that differ vastly in its size.12 The countries studied on the previous section exhibit
a relatively stable regional configuration, as shown by the rather small variation of their
decentralization indexes, with one notable exception: Spain. It is exactly this time variation
that we exploit in order to address the following question: if decentralization affects fiscal
policy, what are the direct effects from further decentralizing it fiscal policy on economic
growth?
12For example, Germany’s largest region Nordrhein-Westfalen is about three times larger than Denmark
in terms of population.
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Spain offers a unique example of fiscal decentralization due to historical reasons. The
dictatorship that ruled the country for almost forty years until 1975 imposed a very central-
ized fiscal system on a very heterogeneous country. One of the main pillars of the Spanish
transition to democracy involved transferring autonomy to the regions. The gradual and
asymmetrical nature of the process can be naturally exploited to test the effects of increas-
ing the fiscal competence of the regional governments.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978, on its Title VII, allowed for the concession of extensive
prerogatives to the regional governments, called Comunidades Auto´nomas.13 The process
was not immediate, however, to the point that it can still be considered an ongoing. Some re-
gions with stronger regional identities moved quickly to approve their regional Constitutions
(Estatutos de Autonomı´a) and started the transfer of prerogatives while other regions lagged
behind and only received these prerogatives after nationwide agreements. The heterogeneity
on the timeline and its predominantly political nature offers a natural experiment of fiscal
decentralization that we exploit to measure its impact on economic growth.
The analysis of this section is based on the data of the Comunidades Auto´nomas’ Budget
Series from the General Secretary for Local and Regional Coordination (Secretar´ıa General
de Coordinacio´n Local y Autono´mica). The database offers yearly consolidated series of 9
income categories and 9 expenditure categories from 1984 to 2013 for the 17 main Spanish
regions. As in the previous section, we will focus on the 1984-2007 period, as the depth of
the current economic crises complicates greatly any analysis of the data from 2008 onwards.
Our analysis will focus on 3 series: direct taxation income, indirect taxation income and
spending. The last series is a composite of expenditure on public wages and public consump-
tion. The analysis of these series allows us to identify major transfers of autonomy to the
regional governments, its timing and its size as a percentage of regional GDP. Combining the
analysis of the series and a narrative approach, we were able to identify five major episodes
of fiscal decentralization, were a prerogative was transferred to the regional governments.
Two important points characterize this analysis. First, even though in every episode
regional tax income or spending increases, these changes are rather interpreted as decentral-
ization shocks than “classical” tax or spending shocks. We use this interpretation because,
in principle, the increase in regional spending and revenue merely offsets the fiscal activity
previously carried out by the central government and does not necessarily have to lead to
a change in total (local and central) government spending or taxes in the region. To the
extent that it does change total government spending or taxes, our analysis provides a mea-
sure for the joint effect of a (decentralization induced) change in actual spending or taxes
and a change in efficiency of spending and tax collection. In either case the results provide
evidence for the effects arising from decentralization through increased fiscal independence of
13A detailed report on the beginning of the process can be found in Molero (2001).
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the regions. Second, we provide evidence that the timing of the implementation of regional
fiscal policy was largely exogenous to economic conditions in a particular region (or Spain)
and primarily politically motivated.14 This exogenous variation reinforces our identification
of the effects arising from decentralization shocks.15
3.3.2 Episodes of Decentralization
Based on a narrative approach to identify discretionary policy measures, we observe five
major episodes in the decentralization process of Spain:
1. The decentralization of health services. This process spanned over 20 years, with some
regions, like Catalonia, gaining the prerogatives on health services as early as 1981
whereas the majority of the regions finally gained the competence in 2001. On average,
this transfer of competence resulted on a permanent increase of regional spending of
over 3% of regional GDP.
2. The decentralization of non-tertiary education. As with the previous case, regions as
Catalonia and the Basque Country started handling non-tertiary education as early as
1980. The process of decentralization concluded in 1999. The result was an average
permanent increase of regional spending of around 2.5% of regional GDP.
3. First transfer of the Income Tax. In 1996, regions were allowed to keep up to 15%
of all the Income Tax collected on their territory. Five regions stood out of this
agreement: on one hand, Navarra and the Basque Country already handled most of
their own taxes; on the other hand, Andaluc´ıa, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha
argued that the cession broke the principle of regional solidarity and was therefore
unconstitutional. These regions appealed the law on the Constitutional Court. The
appeal was overturned and these regions finally complied and started collecting their
allotted share when the Income Tax was transferred for the second time, as discussed
below. On average, this transfer created a permanent increase on direct taxation
income of the regions of around 1% of regional GDP.
4. Second transfer of the Income Tax. In 2001, the proportion of the Income Tax collected
on their territory that regions were allowed to keep raised up to 33 %. This time, only
Navarra and the Basque Country were not directly affected. The size of the shock was
similar to the first transfer of Income Tax.
14See, for example, the analysis of Sua´rez-Pandiello (1999).
15 One drawback of our approach (which is also the case for the cross-country section) is that we cannot
control for anticipation of these effects.
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5. Transfer of the Value Added Tax (VAT). Also in 2001, regions were allowed to keep up
to 35% of all the VAT collected on their territory. As before, Navarra and the Basque
Country were not directly affected, but neither were the Canary Islands, which have
a different indirect taxation regime. The transfer resulted on a permanent increase of
indirect taxation income of around 3.7% of regional GDP.
The nature of these series allows us to use an empirical strategy similar to Romer and
Romer (2010). The authors introduce what has become known as the “narrative approach”
to identify fiscal policy shocks by analyzing a series of exogenous tax changes based on
historical records in the US.16 Similarly, we construct series of exogenous decentralization
changes, valued 0 for every t except where we have identified a decentralization change, in
which case the series takes the value of the size of the change in terms of % of regional GDP.
In this case, the year of the shock will be the year in which we observe the actual change in the
series of the respective fiscal measure, not the year in which the legislation was introduced.
Further, we combine the first two episodes into a single “Spending Decentralization” shocks
series; episodes three and four are combined into a single “Direct Taxation” shocks series,
while the last episode defines “Indirect Taxation” shocks. We also define a “Decentralization”
shock series, created by combining all shocks. With this definition, we aim at capturing the
effect of the change when it is effectively introduced. Given that our series on decentralization
changes are the reflection of a political process, we expect no systematic correlation between
these changes and other determinants of output growth. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis
is presented in the next section.
We explain our approach to identifying decentralization shocks via the example of the
region of Arago´n. Figure (3.7) shows the first difference of the three aforementioned series
measured as percentage of regional GDP. It shows clearly the five episodes of decentralization.
The transfer of non-tertiary education appears as an increase on spending of almost 2% of
regional GDP in 1999, whereas the transfer of health services is captured by the jump on
spending of more than a 3% of regional GDP during 2004. The increased cession of the
Income Tax appears as spikes in Direct Taxation of around 1% of GDP during 1998 and
then 2002. Finally, the cession of part of the Value Added Tax creates a spike on Indirect
Taxation of 3.5% of regional GDP during 2004. Notice also that figure (3.7) presents the first
difference of the relative fiscal variable and hence all episodes represent permanent shocks
as the prerogative is transferred to the region on a permanent basis.
16Subsequently these series are employed by the authors to quantify the effect of tax changes on GDP
growth.
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Figure 3.7: First difference of the Spending, Indirect Taxation and Direct Taxation series
for Arago´n, measured as % of regional GDP, 1985-2007.
Full sample Early adopters Late adopters
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Avg Population 2335.5 (2071.7) 3467.6 (2432.4) 1542.9 (1410.9)
Avg. GDP per capita 12821.7 (2639.7) 13172.8 (2585.0) 12575.9 (2787.5)
Avg. real GDP growth 3.71 (0.58) 3.70 (0.56) 3.74 (0.63)
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for Early adopters and Late adopters. Population is mea-
sured in thousands, GDP in Euros and growth rates are computet year-on-year. Standard
deviation in parenthesis. Years 1984-2007.
3.3.3 Justification of the Narrative Approach
In order to identify the effect of decentralization on output, it is crucial that the timing of the
policy measures is not driven systematically by economic conditions.17 As we have discussed
previously, the decentralization process in Spain is interesting in this sense: because the
timing of the implementation was brought about by the political process, the shocks can be
reasonably thought of as variations in fiscal policy that are exogenous to economic conditions.
In this section, we investigate the claim of exogeneity in two ways.
As a first approximation, we divide the regions into early and late adopters to see if we
observe systematic differences between these groups. We classify as early adopters those
regions that took the initiative to decentralize competences and, therefore, got these com-
petences early; and as late adopters the regions that only received competences on the
17If, for example, the implementation is carried out during episodes of (non-) favorable economic forecasts,
we might find a spurious positive (negative) effect from decentralization to output growth.
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Direct taxation Indirect taxation Spending Any shock
∆Y 1.533 0.877 0.956 2.703*
(0.93) (0.69) (0.86) (1.40)
∆Y (−1) 0.607 -0.338 -0.072 -0.032
(0.92) (0.68) (0.85) (1.38)
∆Y (−2) -0.931 -0.077 0.351 -0.381
(0.87) (0.64) (0.80) (1.30)
∆Y (−3) 0.402 0.874 0.316 1.164
(0.75) (0.56) (0.70) (1.13)
∆Y (−4) -0.041 0.537 -0.297 -0.017
(0.67) (0.50) (0.62) (1.01)
Constant 0.031 -0.021 0.028 0.049
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
R-squared 0.018 0.021 0.010 0.020
No. of obs. 323 323 323 323
Table 3.5: Regression results for the effects of past GDP growth on the probability of imple-
menting a decentralization measure. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the
value 1 in the years when reforms where implemented.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90, .95 and .99 level, respectively
framework of nationwide agreements, where the central government took the initiative. The
sorting - motivated by the historical accounts of the decentralization process provided in
the previous section - is displayed in table (3.8) in Appendix B. The differences in terms of
the timing of decentralization is indeed substantial: for example, the average year in which
the decentralization of health services occurred was 1988 for the early adopters and 2000 for
the late adopters. Table (3.4) shows that while early adopters are larger regions in terms of
population, there appear to be no systematic differences in GDP per capita or growth rates
for our sample period.
To further justify our narrative approach - in particular to exclude economic conditions
as a cause for the introduction of decentralization - we perform four predictive regressions
of the following form: as independent variable, we defined dummy variables (one for each of
the three types of decentralization shocks and another one picking up any decentralization
shock) with value 1 on the years where we have identified a decentralization shock in our
series and 0 otherwise. As dependent variables we use lags of real regional GDP annual
growth. Due to the nature of our data, we use a panel data regression with fixed effects in
a linear probability framework. The results of this exercise can be seen in Table (3.5).
As can be seen in table (3.5), we fail to observe any consistent and significant impact
from past GDP growth on the timing of the decentralization shocks. The largest and only
significant coefficient corresponds to the contemporaneous relationship between decentraliza-
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tion and growth and plausibly - in particular due to the absence of any effects from lagged
output growth - captures the effect from decentralization on growth. Both pieces of evidence
reinforce our interpretation that the timing of the decentralization episodes where mostly
politically motivated and hence exogenous to current output growth. This justifies the use
of the narrative approach as outlined in the next section.
3.3.4 Empirical Framework
The empirical specification extends the regression framework proposed by Romer and Romer
2010 to panel data: we employ fixed effects regressions (i.e. including region-specific inter-
cepts) with real regional output growth as the dependent variable.
The regressors include the series of decentralization shocks, including lags, as well as lags
of output growth. More specifically, denoting by dirt, indt and spet our series of Direct
Taxation shocks, Indirect Taxation shocks and Spending shocks respectively, the regression
framework is
∆Yi,t = ai +
M∑
i=0
bjDi,t−j +
N∑
k=1
ck∆Yi,t−k + ei,t, (3.8)
where Yi,t is the logarithm of real regional output in region i at time t andD = {dir, ind, spe}
is our measure of decentralization. Estimations are carried out for the joint set of fiscal policy
shocks series, as well as for the individual and the aggregate (sum of the three single series)
series. In order to allow for a lag in the output reaction to decentralization, we include five
lags of the fiscal policy shocks, i.e. M = 5, and one lag of GDP growth, to control for the
usual autoregressive dynamics of GDP growth.
We measure output using nominal series of regional GDP deflated by an annual average
price index for every region. D = {dir, ind, spe} is our measure of changes in decentraliza-
tion as a % of regional GDP. The data is yearly, the period of analysis is 1985-2007 and the
cross-sectional units are the 17 Comunidades Auto´nomas.
3.3.5 Results
This section presents and discusses the estimation results for the effects of the different type
of decentralization shocks. Table (3.9) in Appendix B presents the results for the regressions
of Equation (3.8). In addition, we compute the cumulative impact after m periods as as the
sum of the regression coefficients corresponding to respective lags of the fiscal policy shocks,
to obtain the corresponding point estimates,
Cummulative Effect(m) =
m∑
j=0
bj. (3.9)
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Figure 3.8: Accumulated response of an spending decentralization shock, single and joint
regressions. Thinner lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
Spending Decentralization
The decentralization of spending categories like health care and non-tertiary education were
some of the largest, in terms of regional GDP, transfers of competences registered in our
database. However, we find only a small effect of these transfers on regional growth.
On the individual regression, without the other two shocks included, a transfer of spend-
ing competences equivalent to 1% of GDP achieves would achieve its maximum effect 4 years
after the shock, adding less than 0.8 percentage points to regional GDP after that period,
although for most periods the effect is not significant at the 95 % confidence level. When we
introduce the other two shocks in the regression, the spending decentralization shocks are
not longer significant and the size of their effect is smaller.
Indirect taxation decentralization
In the case of the decentralization of indirect taxation competences, we find a somewhat
larger effect that is, however, only significant in the long term (after 4 years) in the joint
regression. On the single regression, the decentralization of indirect taxation equivalent to
1% of regional GDP would add a maximum of around 1.28 percentage points to regional
growth after 5 years. However, after controlling for the other shocks, this decentralization
shock only gains significance after 4 years. The size of the effect is smaller and just 0.94
percentage points after 5 years.
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Figure 3.9: Accumulated response of an indirect taxation decentralization shock, single and
joint regressions. Thinner lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
To put this result into perspective, during the sample period of 1984-2007, the Spanish
regions grew an average of 3.71% yearly. On a six year period, this growth rate implies a total
growth of a 22.26 per cent. The average indirect taxation decentralization shock amounted to
3.70% of regional GDP which, multiplied by the accumulated effect computed before, implies
an increase of 3.49 percentage points over the next 6 years (to include contemporaneous
effects) or, in other words, an increase of around 15.7% over the average registered regional
GDP growth.
Direct taxation decentralization
The decentralization of direct taxation registers the largest effects on regional GDP growth
despite being, on average, the smaller of the three shocks considered. Furthermore, of the
three shocks considered, the decentralization of direct taxation is the only one whose effect
is positive and statistically significant for all number of lags considered. When the direct
taxation shocks are included as regressors individually, the estimated accumulated effect
of decentralizing direct taxation amounts to 1% of regional GDP would be to add 5.26
percentage points to regional GDP after 5 years. When all decentralization shocks series are
included in the regression, the maximum effect peaks after 3 years at around 4.4 percentage
points.
Similar to the case of the decentralization of indirect taxation, we can this number into
perspective. In this case, the average direct decentraliaztion shock amounted to around
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Figure 3.10: Accumulated response of a direct taxation decentralization shock, single and
joint regressions. Thinner lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
1.06% of regional GDP, so the comparison is more straightforward. With an average growth
of 3.71% yearly, the average region would have grown 14.48% over a 4 year span (again,
to include contemporaneous effects), so that the added growth due to the decentralization
shock amounts to 31.4% of the average registered regional GDP growth.
Aggregate decentralization shock
Finally, for reference, we consider an aggregate decentralization shock, constructed simply
by adding together the series of the three individual shocks. Doing so, we observe how this
aggregate shock is positive and statistically significant from impact, peaking after 4 years
with an cumulative effect of around 0.74% of regional GDP.
In our data, the average aggregate decentralization shock amounts to 2.90% of regional
GDP which, multiplied by the accumulated effect computed before, implies adding 2.14
percentage points to GDP growth over the following 4 years. Given that the average region
would have grown 18.55% over a 5 year span, the shock would be equivalent to an increase
of 11.6% of the total registered GDP growth.
3.3.6 Discussion
For a interpretation of these results, it is useful to place them in their historical context.
Furthermore, the results we have obtained in the previous section allow us to connect to
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Figure 3.11: Accumulated response of an aggregate decentralization shock. Thinner lines
represent the 95% confidence interval.
prevailing theories of fiscal federalism.
First, the changes on spending decentralization involved mainly the transfer of the com-
petences on Health Care and Education to the regions. Since all regions already had func-
tioning sanitary and educative sectors, the margin for fiscal maneuver was limited: collective
agreements with the workers had to be honored and standards were set so as to ensure that
every citizen in the country had access to a similar level of services, for example. Therefore,
it is to be expected that the spending decentralization shocks studied here will have a small
effect on the economic output of the regions.
Second, the changes in indirect taxation consisted typically in an increase of the propor-
tion of taxes collected on the region that the regional governments could hold on to. On the
one hand, these changes were usually matched with corresponding reductions on the amount
of transfers received from the central government. Furthermore, the tax rates for the VAT
are decided at the central level and are the same for all regions. On the other hand, decen-
tralizing the collection of indirect taxation can in principle induce the regional governments
to foster economic growth, as it expands the tax base and so increases their income. This
idea follows the arguments developed in the so-called “Second generation fiscal federalism”,
that emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosper-
ity.18 The lower reliance on transfers and higher reliance on own resources could nudge the
regions into introducing measures destined to expand their tax base and create economic
18For a survey in the topic, see for example Weingast (2009).
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Figure 3.12: Average effective tax rate and tax base (in millions of euros) for the labor
income tax. Spain 1995-2007. Source: Agencia Tributaria.
growth. In principle, this mechanism would explain the fact that the decentralization of
indirect taxation only turns significant after some years, as the potential changes introduced
by the regions to foster growth and so reap the benefits of an increased tax base would take
time to materialize.
Finally, the decentralization of direct taxation registers a significant, positive effect on
regional income growth. The key in this case is that the decentralization of the income
tax included the possibility for regional government to modify legislative aspects, such as
tax rates, brackets and deductions, affecting their tax scheme design as well as total taxes
collected. Therefore, the decentralization of direct taxation implied not only a change in the
way a region finances itself, as the decentralization of indirect taxation, but also opened up
the possibilities of the regions to conduct fiscal policy.
On top of the possible effect on the incentives to increase the tax base, the decentral-
ization of direct taxation plus giving legislative powers on taxation to the regions opens a
new channel of influence of decentralization on growth through tax competition. Allowing
regional governments to (partially) set the tax rate can promote tax competition between
jurisdictions, resulting in lower tax rate and promoting growth. A modified version of this
theory can be traced back to the work of Brennan and Buchanan (1980), where the authors
used the tax competition argument to partly construct the “Leviathan hypothesis”: more-
decentralized government structures should be smaller, in terms of government spending,
relative to the size of the economy.
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In fact, we find some evidence of tax competition, as can be seen in figure (3.12). The
average effective tax rate naturally grows over time as the nominal tax base grows and
workers move into higher brackets. There are two big drops in the average effective tax
rate that match exactly the years were the income tax was reformed to allow the regions to
keep part of the tax collected on their territory. Unfortunately, the available data does not
allow to disentangle the part of the drop in the average effective tax rate due to the decrease
in the tax rate induced by the central government from the part induced by the regional
governments.
The results discussed here also tie nicely with the analysis in the previous section. In
the first part we saw that more decentralized countries tend to have larger multipliers cor-
responding to their fiscal policy. Similarly, the second part showed how moving into more
decentralized political structures produces a positive effect on the economic growth of the
regions involved. The main conclusion from the paper is, therefore, in line with the classical
theory of fiscal decentralization: fiscal policy becomes more effective when it allows regions
to manage policies tailored to their citizens. At the same time, it is important to notice that
the focus of this study were the short term dynamics and transition mechanism for fiscal
policy. Potential long run effects that include a more detailed investigation of regional debt
dynamics, for example, are left for further research.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper evaluates empirically the effects from decentralizing fiscal policy. The first section
comprises a cross-country analysis of 11 European countries that differ substantially in their
degree of decentralization. We find that more decentralized countries, i.e. countries in which
regions have larger fiscal competences relative to the central government, tend to have larger
fiscal multipliers. We interpret this as evidence in favorable gains from regionally tailored
fiscal policy. We also provide evidence from a case study of Spain, where we exploit time
variation in decentralization. These decentralization changes were orthogonal to economic
conditions, and can therefore be used to measure the direct impact of decentralization on
output growth. We find economically large and statistically significant positive effects from
the decentralization of direct taxation, and, to a lesser extent, from indirect taxation and
government spending on GDP growth. Part of the positive effect on output growth can be
attributed to a reduction in taxes collected, and is likely to be attributed to tax competition
between provinces. In line with our cross-country analysis, the results from the case study
of Spain reinforce the evidence for efficiency gains through (regionally) tailored fiscal policy.
90
3.A Appendix: Decentralization Measures and Cross-
country Comparison
Alternative Measures of Decentralization
Figure 3.13: Decentralization Index: Regional share of spending including transfers in %.
Averages along with highest and lowest observation. Calculation based on yearly data 1996
- 2011.
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Figure 3.14: Decentralization Index: Regional share of taxation including transfers in %.
Averages along with highest and lowest observation. Calculation based on yearly data 1996
- 2011.
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Decentralization and key economic variables
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Figure 3.15: Decentralization Index vs. Size of Government Spending.
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Figure 3.16: Decentralization Index vs. Government Debt
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Spending Con. Spending Inv. Spending Revenues
Austria 0.233 0.209 0.0247 0.500
(0.0193) (0.0111) (0.00907) (0.0268)
Denmark 0.288 0.251 0.0371 0.541
(0.0121) (0.00754) (0.00792) (0.0180)
France 0.282 0.240 0.0425 0.487
(0.0109) (0.00938) (0.00265) (0.0123)
Germany 0.216 0.192 0.0241 0.413
(0.0116) (0.0103) (0.00304) (0.0270)
Greece 0.234 0.206 0.0321 0.352
(0.00743) (0.0106) (0.00468) (0.0669)
Italy 0.232 0.208 0.0246 0.421
(0.0161) (0.0134) (0.00328) (0.0367)
Portugal 0.226 0.183 0.0432 0.345
(0.0122) (0.0128) (0.00566) (0.0901)
Spain 0.197 0.159 0.0384 0.361
(0.0190) (0.0124) (0.00813) (0.0289)
Sweden 0.366 0.322 0.0435 0.581
(0.0347) (0.0323) (0.00474) (0.0248)
Switzerland 0.148 0.115 0.0327 0.327
(0.00816) (0.00604) (0.00321) (0.0290)
UK 0.239 0.221 0.0174 0.374
(0.0202) (0.0227) (0.00393) (0.0309)
Table 3.6: Spending and Revenues over GDP by country. Spending denotes the sum of
government consumption and investment expenditure; Cons. and Inv. Spending stand for
consumption and investment spending, respectively. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Quarterly observations, 1980 - 2007.
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GDP growth (pct.) (X+IM)/GDP Population Gross debt/GDP (pct.)
Austria 1.946 2.951 7.853 63.27
(1.154) (0.626) (0.252) (4.403)
Denmark 1.961 2.444 5.232 54.88
(1.656) (0.261) (0.117) (15.43)
France 1.656 1.821 57.46 46.07
(1.177) (0.258) (2.302) (15.77)
Germany 1.705 2.304 80.11 56.35
(1.487) (0.451) (2.450) (8.688)
Greece 1.704 1.417 10.46 72.77
(2.528) (0.133) (0.494) (27.80)
Italy 1.665 1.782 56.91 101.9
(1.262) (0.252) (0.464) (9.609)
Portugal 2.557 2.348 10.14 55.73
(2.439) (0.195) (0.219) (5.078)
Spain 2.380 1.620 39.88 44.95
(1.769) (0.338) (2.046) (13.16)
Sweden 2.094 2.332 8.699 56.87
(1.776) (0.421) (0.276) (11.20)
Switzerland 1.199 2.618 6.883 48.63
(1.796) (0.315) (0.383) (12.81)
United Kingdom 2.412 1.785 57.99 41.72
(1.602) (0.103) (1.404) (4.876)
Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics for additional determinants of fiscal multipliers by country,
yearly observations 1980 - 2007. Population is in million. Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database and eLibrary.
Bootstrap algorithm for Averaged Multipliers
This section describes the bootstrap algorithm used for obtaining the confidence bands for
the average multiplier across a specific country group.
1. Draw n nonparametric impulse responses (IRFs) for each country individually. Each
of the n IRFs is obtained by bootstrapping the residuals and reestimating the VAR.
In each replication, the residuals drawn have the same time index t for each country
in a respective group.
2. Standardize each impulse response by dividing by the size of the fiscal shock and the
average fiscal variable to GDP ratio.
3. Draw (with replacement) one impulse response function for each country in the re-
spective group. These draws are not independent across countries, but ensure that
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the impulse reponse function of each country are based on on the same time index t
residuals. Then compute the average impulse response for each horizon.
4. Repeat step 3 m times.
5. Compute Hall (2013)-percentiles from m draws obtained above (as described e.g. in
Lu¨tkepohl 2005).
Robustness: Results from 2 Variable VARs
Figure 3.17: Cummulative Spending Multipliers, average across country group. The multi-
pliers describe the output response to a positive spending shock. Estimates are based on a
2-variable VAR including output and government spending.
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Figure 3.18: Cummulative Revenue Multipliers, average across country group. The multipli-
ers describe the output response to a negative tax shock. Estimates are based on a 2-variable
VAR including output and government revenues.
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Figure 3.19: Cummulative Revenue Multipliers, average across country group. The multi-
pliers describe the output response to a positive government consumption shock. Estimates
are based on a 2-variable VAR including output and government consumption spending.
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Figure 3.20: Cummulative Revenue Multipliers, average across country group. The multi-
pliers describe the output response to a positive government consumption shock. Estimates
are based on a 2-variable VAR including output and government investment spending.
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3.B Appendix: Intranational Evidence
Justification of the narrative approach - Late vs. Early Adopters
Early adopters Late adopters
Andaluc´ıa Arago´n
Canarias Asturias
Catalunya Islas Baleares
Galicia Castilla-La Mancha
Navarra Cantabria
Pa´ıs Vasco Castilla y Leo´n
Comunitat Valenciana Extremadura
Comunidad de Madrid
Murcia
La Rioja
Table 3.8: Early adopters are regions that tended to implement fiscal reforms prior to the
late adopters.
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Regression results
A B C D
∆Y (−1) 0.3512*** 0.4205*** 0.4315*** 0.3196***
(0.05866) (0.05685) (0.04804) (0.07006)
Direct taxation 0.0083*** 0.0116***
(0.00149) (0.00205)
L.Direct taxation 0.0102*** 0.0129***
(0.00228) (0.00320)
L2.Direct taxation 0.0126*** 0.0118***
(0.00280) (0.00310)
L3.Direct taxation 0.0113*** 0.0078**
(0.00218) (0.00273)
L4.Direct taxation 0.0055** -0.0014
(0.00221) (0.00254)
L5.Direct taxation 0.0047 -0.0023
(0.00290) (0.00295)
Indirect taxation 0.0017* -0.0012
(0.00086) (0.00083)
L.Indirect taxation 0.0023*** 0.0002
(0.00049) (0.00103)
L2.Indirect taxation 0.0037*** 0.0016**
(0.00078) (0.00073)
L3.Indirect taxation 0.0022** 0.0022**
(0.00077) (0.00086)
L4.Indirect taxation 0.0022** 0.0039***
(0.00077) (0.00117)
L5.Indirect taxation 0.0007 0.0028
(0.00127) (0.00168)
Spending 0.0015 0.0006
(0.00095) (0.00106)
L.Spending -0.0000 -0.0013
(0.00125) (0.00157)
L2.Spending 0.0014 0.0017*
(0.00157) (0.00089)
L3.Spending 0.0027*** 0.0018*
(0.00079) (0.00104)
L4.Spending 0.0023 0.0007
(0.00136) (0.00150)
L5.Spending -0.0014 -0.0017
(0.00171) (0.00157)
Constant 0.0163*** 0.0172*** 0.0173*** 0.0166***
(0.00132) (0.00154) (0.00137) (0.00142)
R-squared 0.3151 0.2745 0.2441 0.3443
No. of obs. 267 261 306 260
Table 3.9: Effect of a decentralization shock on ∆Y, the (log) growth rate of regional GDP.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90,
.95 and .99 level, respectively
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